

A N
A D D R E S S
T O
Honest *English* Hearts,

B E I N G
An Honest Countryman's REFLECTIONS

O N
The CYDER-TAX. | The late Treaty of
The Commitment of | P E A C E, and
Mr. W I L K E S. | The present Opposition.

We are a well-meaning honest People, apt indeed to be too hasty in forming judgments: and being conscious that we mean well, and not suffering ourselves to consider that the best intention cannot carry us right, if we follow a *Guide* which leads us wrong; we are apt also to be too violent in adhering to opinions, which, perhaps, without either reason or thought, we have entertained. But this violence at length wears away, reason resumes her proper authority over us, and we, with shame and confusion of face, acknowledge we have been imposed on, and detest the Impostors which misled us.

See page 145.

L O N D O N,

Printed for JAMES FLETCHER and Co. at the Oxford
Theatre, in St. Paul's-Church-Yard.

M D C C L X I I I.

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
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THE P R E F A C E.

WHEN I sat down to write the following Reflections, I little thought of troubling the Reader with a Preface to them. In the introduction I acquainted him with my views, and what I intended to set before him, and did not suppose that either the occasion would need, or that he would require any other Preface. But, in the course of my Address, I found myself obliged so often to write, merely from the memory of what I had read, when I had no thought of being a Political Author, and consequently did not make my remarks on it with that precision which every one would be glad to use concerning what he proposes to make the subject of an application to the Public, that I now think it proper to advertise the Reader of this circumstance: for, notwithstanding my care to advance nothing but what is true, I think it not improbable that, in some trivial point or other, I may have committed a mistake; and I do not doubt, but any thing of this kind will be traduced and magnified by all the means which Faction can make use

of. Nor do I doubt but many of the true things I have said will be represented as false; and any little real mistake I may have been guilty of will be insisted on, and aggravated to give a colour and credit to their other misrepresentations.

I am therefore to beg the Reader, that he would not suffer these wretches to prejudice him so far as will prevent his considering every thing I have said with candour and impartiality: a man may be very much in the right upon the whole of a comprehensive argument, though mistaken in one or two of the observations by which he endeavours to support it.

Let me not here be supposed to speak thus, as being conscious, that I have advanced what will not bear examination: I hope there is nothing said in the following pamphlet but what upon enquiry will prove true; and am verily persuaded there is no material untruth in it. But — humanum est errare.

It will be asked me perhaps, what the Reader is to do then? Would I have him believe me, for my professions of truth and honesty, more than other writers who make the same professions? No! I expect no such thing; I make no doubt but the impartial Reader will suppose the writer of this Preface as capable of pretending to honesty, while he endeavours to impose on his Reader's credulity, as any other author whom he is not acquainted with, and therefore will be as much upon his guard, with respect to him as
any

any other, and will be careful not to admit any thing to be true, merely because he says, it.

But I hope the Reader will be pleased to make such enquiries as it may be in his power to make, whether the things here said are true or false; — that he will recollect what he heard or read on the subjects which are here debated, before the present advocates for Faction found it their interest to misrepresent them; — that he will particularly consider the reasonings which are here offered him on the circumstances in which the Nation at present stands, and the consequences of the present Opposition to the King. * — that he will calmly and seriously ask himself what he can gain by the Faction's distressing his Majesty, and forcing him to deliver up the Government into their hands? — and think what he may lose by their succeeding so far, and by the squabbles which their own Animosities and particular Interests will certainly occasion as soon as they have so far succeeded.

Let me hope too, that he will suspend his assent to the contradiction which will be made to what I tell him, until he has heard what I shall have to say in its defence; and I promise him I will acknowledge the truth of every thing which I find true in the Objections made to me.

If it is asked, why, if I am apprehensive, as I have acknowledged I am, that, for want of

* See Page 26.

proper information, I may have made mistakes in what I have said, — why I would write upon a subject which I was not fully informed of, or at least why I would publish, until I had informed myself better? — I answer that the flames kindled by the discontented Parties (for the present Faction consists of more than one Party) are kept up and encouraged with so much assiduity and wicked industry, that it appears to be both the duty and interest of every honest man to strive to quench them; as one of that character, I contribute my assistance; it will not, I am afraid, do all the service I would wish to do.

But it may do some : It may engage some well meaning honest-minded men to think calmly, — to enquire whither the clamorous are leading them, — and to consider what dreadful consequences may be expected to follow on Faction's carrying its point. This is my reason for publishing these reflections; not a few of them arise from circumstances of which there is no doubt: Such for instance as respect the Bill for taxing Cyder, the Commitment of Mr. Wilkes; the mischiefs of Smuggling, and those with which Faction, like the Grecian Horse, is fraught, and which will soon overpower us, if we permit it to rear its head within our walls. These reflections may be judged of independently of the arguments about the Peace; and, if they carry the weight which I think they do, every disinterested man, and good Patriot, will heartily set himself to oppose and stifle the Faction, which so loudly threatens us. Surely

Surely some greater Divinity than a mere spirit of foresight and prudence possessed the King, when, in the declaration he made to his Council the first day of his Reign, he so affectionately threw himself on the “support of every honest Man.” * No human mind could, at that time, have supposed it possible for his Majesty ever to be in circumstances wherein he would need honest men’s assistance and support so much as he now seems to do. Possessed of every quality which should endear a Monarch to his People, and habituated to the

* I hope the Reader will have the goodness to excuse me indulging myself so far as to transcribe the following passages.

In his speech to the Council, the day of his accession, the King says, “Animated by the tenderest affection for
“ my native Country, and depending upon the advice,
“ experience, and abilities of your Lordships, on the support of every honest man, I enter—into this arduous
“ situation, and shall make it the business of my life to
“ promote in every thing the glory and happiness of these
“ Kingdoms.”

In his first Speech to the Parliament we hear him telling—“the peculiar happiness of my life will ever consist in
“ promoting the welfare of a people, whose loyalty and
“ warm affection to me I consider as the greatest and
“ most permanent security of my throne. And I doubt
“ not but their steadiness in those principles will equal the
“ firmness of my invariable resolution to adhere to and
“ strengthen this excellent Constitution in Church and
“ State, and to maintain the Toleration inviolable. The
“ civil and religious Rights of my loving subjects
“ are equally dear to me with the most valuable Prerogatives of my Crown; and as the surest foundation of the
“ whole, and the best means to draw down the Divine
“ favour on my Reign, it is my fixed purpose to countenance and encourage the practice of true Religion and
“ Virtue.”

practice of every Virtue which might be expected to “draw down the Divine favour” on his Reign,” could it have been thought possible that he should be opposed, traduced, vilified and persecuted in the manner we have seen?

And for what has he been thus opposed, vilified, and persecuted? Merely because he had the feelings of Humanity for his People; was backward in entering on a War which must be both bloody and expensive, unwilling to lavish away their blood and treasure unnecessarily; for this is given as the ground of the Resignation to which all the rest is owing. But it is highly probable that the true ground of all the abuse his Majesty has suffered is his resolution, not to be controuled by a presumptuous servant; for little doubt can be made but the Right Honourable Gentleman would have found some other occasion of struggling for the *guidance of measures*, if this had not offered so seasonably.

The mention of the insults offered to the King, has, I find, betrayed me into a digression. I forgot I was to give my Reader an answer to this question, why (even though I thought it necessary to contribute my little help to the service of the Public in its present circumstances) I would publish before I had procured sufficient information concerning the subjects I was to speak to? Why truly I must do so, if I would publish at all; for I live in the country, where it is not possible to get such information. I did, indeed,
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
When I resolved to write on this subject, order my (country) Bookseller to get me such and such pamphlets as I had accidentally seen before, or judged would assist me in the business I was undertaking, from the account given of them in a News-paper or Magazine. But he sent me word, that his correspondent informed him, few of them were to be met with. I was necessitated, therefore, to communicate my thoughts to the Reader, as he here has them. It is his part to make me such allowances as he thinks equitable.


Need I say more than I have said to engage his candour? I can assure him that for his service (at least, however weak my *powers* are, my *intention* is to serve him) I have brought myself into a situation the most disagreeable to my temper and inclination of any I could have fallen into, viz. a state of public altercation. I must not now (at least not for one Winter) run over a Weekly Courant, or a Monthly Magazine, with the calm indifference and tranquillity with which I used to read them, merely for matter of chat with my neighbours, or for motives of Self-Contentment and Thankfulness to God's good Providence for placing me so happily out of the bustle and contentions of the world, wherein I see other people struggling and tormenting their neighbours and themselves.

I must now enquire for *Monitors and North-Britons*, and see myself traduced as a mercenary hireling scribler, Jacobite, Hanoverian,

Hanoverian, Scotsman, Tory, Traitor, Devil, Knave, Fool, and Sot.

My hopes, in the mean while, are, that the good-natured disinterested Reader, when he meets with me thus abused, will compassionately think, “ this he endures for me; and that I myself shall be composed enough to lay the libel, when I have read it through, calmly down, and, if the weather shall permit, take a turn in my garden, and think *pro Patriâ vel mori decorum est, et dulce.*






A N

A D D R E S S

T O

Honest *English* Hearts, &c.

 HERE is a sort of people, whose interests are so connected with that of the Gentlemen, in whose hands the Administration of the Government of these Kingdoms hath been lodged for some time past, that of course they like the measures those Gentlemen have pursued; *i. e.* they like what is done by those Gentlemen, because they have done it, independently of the merit, or demerit, of those measures, with regard to the Commonwealth. These men are too firmly fixed in their opinion, to believe any thing can be reason which would persuade them to think otherwise: and therefore do not come into the number of those to whom the following reflexions are addressed.

There is another sort of people, whose interests are so much affected by the resignations which have been made (for their friend, or

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their

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their friend's friend, has lost the power of doing them an expected service) that they see every thing which has been done by them whom their friends have left in an unfavourable view, and think every thing has been done wrong; and as much of course condemn every thing, as those before-mentioned applaud every thing. These therefore can no more be the people I am writing to than they. None of them are at liberty to guide their judgment by the dictates of reason, or public spirit; and all I have to offer is drawn from one or the other of these considerations.

There are, however, numbers of my fellow-subjects, who, like myself, are free from any byass of private interest, having nothing either to gain or lose, whoever shall be in or out of place, any otherwise than as the general good of our Country shall be promoted or hurt. If the affairs of government are so managed, that our Country thrives, we have our share of the general prosperity. If on the contrary it sickens, whoever may, by the advantage of any particular circumstances, be exempted from the distresses which will follow, we are sure to feel them. It would therefore be unnatural for us to like or dislike any measures of government, but as they tend to the benefit or damage of the Commonwealth. Whatever tends to increase its strength and riches, to preserve it in peace and plenty, or to promote the virtue and religion of all its members, deserves our approbation and thanks, whoever was the Minister to whose
counsel

counsel we owe the salutary measure. And every thing which has a tendency to corrupt the manners of the People, to lessen their riches and power, or weaken the foundation on which the enjoyment of their liberty, plenty, or peace, must stand, ought to be the object of our indignation, whether the man with this or the other name advised it.

There may, however, be some among us who unwittingly, with as little intention as reason, have joined the ranks of one or the other of the self-interested Parties but now mentioned. They have been led perhaps to entertain a good or ill opinion of particular persons, and cannot, without doing violence to their prepossessions, suppose any thing to be wrong which is done by those they have thought well of, or any thing to be right which is done by those they have thought ill of. Or they have, they know not how, nor why (perhaps led to it by mere accident) taken up an opinion of what the Government have done, and find it an irksome task to hear any argument brought to prove that they have entertained an error.

There are many honest men who are stiff in their opinion, for no better reason than this. But, would these consider how easy it is for the best judgment to be misled by false information, and how many of the greatest men have been so misled, and have afterwards grown sensible of it, and retracted their error, and gloried in giving this proof of their honesty and ingenuity, they would

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not think it such a shame to confess they have been mistaken. They would rather rejoice in the happy discovery of their mistake, and bless the accident, or information, that shewed them they were in a wrong way, and led them into the right.

Why should they not? They cannot be gainers by thinking any thing but what is true: and, therefore, nothing but what is true should have their assent and approbation. But that which is so should have it, whatever quarter it may be found in. It is their friend, and it is their interest to bid it welcome.

To these, therefore, with the rest of my countrymen, who have no interest but the general good of their Country to sway their judgment, I beg leave to address what I have to say. And, I hope, on a candid, serious, dispassionate perusal of it, they will see reason to think with me. If they do not, let them be pleased to pity the poor man, who has an honest heart, governed by so weak a head.

I do not pretend, Gentlemen, to be in the secret of affairs, or to know more than any other honest countryman might observe, who is attentive to what passes about him. I hear what my neighbours say, when they have been in town. I read the news, as it is retailed to us in the country papers, or a magazine. And I think how the things which I hear and read will affect the interest of the Commonwealth. The result of these reflexions is here presented to you. I desire no other
favour,

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favour, than that what is offered may be considered dispassionately, and judged of fairly. I say nothing but what appears to me to be the truth. If I shall mistake, or misrepresent any fact, it will be for want of better information than it is in my power to get.

In the mean time, my intention and endeavours are certainly laudable. I think I see my Country, placed, by the good providence of God, on an eminence, from which she might overlook and command the world, enjoying herself, in the mean time, with the most profound peace and tranquillity, breathing the sweetest and purest air, surrounded with a plenty of every thing which can contribute to the comfort or pleasure of life, and at *liberty* to use it all, as she shall judge will best suit her convenience, or her delight. But, before she can look round, and observe the advantages of her situation, her attention is distracted by a turbulent party of her children, who, having, for selfish purposes, endeavoured to prevent her gaining that situation, are resolved, by all means in their power, to prevent her enjoying it. With this view, they raise a clamour, tell her the ground she stands on is undermined, and that the servants, by whose ministry she was set there, are her worst enemies. She, alarmed by their cries, and frightened by the dismal representations they make of the danger which threatens her, is ready to descend from her eminence, and to put herself into their hands ;

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while her truest friends, her most dutiful children, and most faithful servants, endeavour in vain to calm her fears, and prevail on her to look about, and judge for herself. In vain, alas! they endeavour it. Their remonstrances are not heard, their assurances are suspected. My Country, my Parent, on whose welfare all my hopes of comfort and prosperity depend, is in danger of being betrayed into difficulties, if not into absolute ruin and beggary, by the treacherous artifices of a few self-interested ambitious men, who abuse her confidence by false stories, and are striving to hoodwink her, that she might not see the misery they would lead her into.

This mischief I, according to my abilities, am endeavouring to prevent. My powers indeed for this service are not equal to my will. But truth and reason, however plainly delivered, may have their effect. And the deficiency which the intelligent reader will undoubtedly find occasion to observe in me, with respect to information, may turn out no disadvantage to the cause. I am engaged in, as it must yield him the better grounds of satisfaction that I tell him but the truth, when I assure him I am entirely unconnected with any of the people I defend, and have as little to bias my judgment in the present disputes, as any Englishman, who is not void of property, can have. The candid reader too will make proper allowances in favour of the cause I would recommend, for its advocate's want of information; he will supply from his own better

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better knowledge many circumstances which will strengthen my arguments, and conclude upon the whole that the cause, which appears reasonable when so defended, must have for its foundation the most undoubted truth and justice.

The subjects I propose to speak to are

The money borrowed for the service of the current year,

The Tax laid for payment of the interest due on it, and

The Peace.

Of the first of these a few words, I am persuaded, will be sufficient. For, though the War was at an end, the expences necessarily attending it were not. We had ships, seamen, and soldiers in every quarter of the world. And these were to be brought home and discharged. Or should we have sent orders to our generals to have discharged them immediately, some in the Philippine islands, some in Bengal, or on the coast of Coromandel; some in Cuba, some in Portugal, and some in Germany? This was done, I think, after the Peace of 1748. —But did we think it right? Did not our hearts bleed within us, when we heard the brave soldier giving an account of that transaction? While he represented the indignation of the army, when they found themselves so treated; the difficulties he was forced to surmount before he could get to England, and the numbers who immediately enlisted themselves in foreign service?

And yet the expence of bringing home all we had abroad, then, would not have been the

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tithe of what it must be now. The ships, however, and seamen which we have abroad, must have been brought home, and what was due to them must have been discharged.— There was yet worse than this. A large debt, owing to the Navy and the Army, must be paid. We had new Countries to take possession of and fertile. We had Minorca to repossess, and we had subsidies to pay to Germany. And could all this be done without expence? Consider impartially the great demands which the Government might foresee would be made on them for money, and you will wonder both that they did not raise more, and that any people can have effrontery enough to say that what they have raised is too much.

But it is asked, Where is the benefit of the Peace, if we must still continue to run ourselves farther in debt? And there are people weak enough, for want of consideration, to think there is some weight in what the question implies. In answer to it however they may be pleased to know,

First, That the sum borrowed now is not more than one third, or perhaps one fourth of what must have been borrowed, had the War continued.

Secondly, That it is borrowed at a much less interest than we must have given for it to have carried on the War.

Thirdly, That the first year of the Peace, whenever it had been made, would have been equally expensive. or even more so, if we should have carried on our conquests farther,
and

and have had more new Countries to take possession of.

The difference, therefore, betwixt making the Peace as we did, and carrying on the War a year longer, is, that we are now 15 millions, or more than 15 millions, less in debt than we should have been the next year, if the next had been the first year after the Peace; and have * 900,000*l.* less to pay yearly for interest. Such is the benefit of the Peace in point of immediate expence! and so absurd and unreasonable is the insinuation, that we might as well have continued the War, as borrow money after we have made a Peace!

But, if money must be borrowed, why must it be borrowed by taxing Cyder? Why must the man who grows apples in his orchard, grind them in his house, and uses the liquor in his family, pay a tax for it?

Let me here be permitted to ask the *Cyder-Gentry*, if they have not as great a share in the liberty, the trade, and the glory of their Country as any of those who make no Cyder? If they have, why should they not bear an equal share of the burthen necessary to be borne for the maintenance of these advantages? The drinker of Malt liquor pays more taxes than one for every drop of liquor he provides, either for the use of his family, or the entertainment of his friends. Why

* A Sum nearly equal to what is raised by a Land-Tax of 2 *s.* in the Pound.

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then should the Gentleman who supports his family, and entertains his friends with Cyder, pay nothing for all his liquor? Can any thing be more unequitable?

The Cyder Counties will not pretend that their liquor is not so good as ours. If we may judge of the comparative goodness of the two liquors by the prices they bear, when carried to distant markets, the Cyder must have the preference. For, notwithstanding it is so much lighter taxed, and so much cheaper made, we find that it can be often sold at a much better price than is ever given for Ale or Beer.

Yet this delicious liquor has been made and drunk in the greatest plenty by a Gentleman who pays nothing for it towards the support of his Country, while another Gentleman who uses a less quantity of Malt liquor pays above 20, 30, or 40 Guineas.

And what is the reason given why the Cyder-drinker should be excused? It has been said "because he grows it in his own orchard, makes it in his own house, &c." But this talking is stuff, not worthy to be answered. Does not the drinker of Beer too grow the Barley in his own field, malt it in his own kiln, and spend it in his own family? Gentlemen, and even Farmers too, did however do so before the Excise on Malt took place. And, if they have forborne to do it since, because they would not have their houses visited by an officer, this is the burthen of the Excise. And a drinker of Cyder,
who

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who for the same reason should send his apples to be ground at a neighbour's mill, would have no more reason to complain than they have.

It is no doubt unhappy for a Country to find itself obliged to tax any necessary commodities of its own growth. But, when any Country is obliged to do so, every member of the community ought, according to his rank and ability, to be taxed equally. To tax one, and not another, would be both unjust and foolish. Unjust, because every one who shares the advantage, should also share the expence by which that advantage is procured. Foolish, because the produce of a Tax laid partially will not be equal to that of the same Tax made general, and consequently, the Government, for want of its full revenue, will either be obliged to impose some other Tax to supply the deficiency, or find itself curbed in its operations for the public benefit.

I need not take pains to shew that it is both unreasonable and ungenerous, in any party of the people, to desire to be excused from bearing their proper share of the public burthens. The meanness and baseness of such a desire are too flagrant for any Englishman to own himself, in plain terms, guilty of it. Yet an opposition is made to the law, which taxes Cyder.

Was a computation to be made of the quantity of Cyder drank tax-free in the Kingdom every year since the first Excise was laid on Malt and Malt liquor, and the sum calculated

culated which a Tax on such quantities of Cyder, equal to that paid by Malt, and the liquor made of it in the same years respectively, would amount to,——was another computation to be made of the monies paid by Malt and its liquor all along more than were paid by proportionable quantities of such Cyder in the same years as on account of sale was charged with some duty,——was another computation to be made what would be the amount of the interest on these several sums from the years when they would have been collected to the present, at the rate of interest paid by the Government in the several years since,——and were all the sums arising from these several calculations to be cast into one, it would appear prodigious. And yet it would be no more than what has been paid, in this course of years, by those who have not drank Cyder for those who have. Nay, the sum would be less than what we have paid for them. For, had these sums been brought into the treasury duly as they ought, we should not have had so much money to borrow, nor consequently so high an interest to give for that we have borrowed.

And is it then unreasonable for us at last to desire our good neighbours would be pleased to take their share of the burthen with us? Is their having gone free from it, while we have been sweating under it these hundred years, a reason for their being suffered to go free longer? So, it seems, they think; and
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are for turning the world upside down, because they are not so suffered.

But they were as quiet as lambs, when one additional duty after another was laid on Beer, and when a duty of two shillings *per* quarter was added to the four shillings *per* quarter which Malt paid before. Shame be to them for their unbrotherly selfishness!

But, in the name of common sense, what can provoke those who are not Cyder-drinkers to join with them in the cry? What has bewitched the commonalty of London to exclaim so much against a Tax on Cyder? Do they relish their *Porter* so much better since the additional duties have * lowered it in strength, and obliged them to give a half-penny a quart more for it?

It has been said, that, when the last Tax on Malt liquor was proposed in council, my Lord Bute objected to it, and was for raising the money wanted on some other fund. I have not heard that he mentioned the particular one he would recommend instead of it. But it is highly probable, from what he has done since, that he had a Tax on Cyder in his view. And, suppose a Tax had been then laid on Cyder instead of that which was laid on

* Mr. Jackson, in the *Appendix* to his *Essay on Bread*, published in 1758, tells us, that "a few years ago a
" Winchester quart of old sound Porter would yield near
" six ounces of good proof Spirits by a careful distilla-
" tion; but the Beer brewed lately will not yield four
" ounces of the same Proof."

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Beer, it would have been surely by much the more reasonable and equitable measure.

Indeed for these many years a Tax on Cyder would have been the most reasonable and equitable Tax which could have been laid. Because one part of the Country ought not to have had a second burthen laid on it, before every part had been made to take its proper share of the first. But this the Cyder Counties are not even now obliged to do. For the four shillings *per* hogshead, which they pay, is much short of the duties we pay on Malt and Hops. They are too greatly favoured in the consideration had of their poorer sort of people. Among us, if a poor family brews a peck of Malt into what they call Beer, to carry into the field with them in harvest, they pay Excise for the liquor in the Malt it is brewed with. But a Cyder-drinking family, if they can content themselves with four hogsheads, may regale themselves plentifully with a strong generous liquor the whole year round, without paying to the Government the value of a straw.

And yet these people complain, and cry out of the hardship laid on them. What an affront this is to the common sense of the rest of the Kingdom, to think we will tamely hear it! What an insult to suppose we are capable of being persuaded to join with *them*! They intend, it seems, the next sessions of Parliament, to petition that the Law which taxes their liquor may be repealed. If they are shameless enough to do so, I hope the rest
of

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of the Kingdom will petition that it may be perpetuated. If we do not, let us never more complain of Debts or Taxes. For the Taxes will lie on us the heavier, and our Debts must remain unpaid the longer, in proportion as the funds established for these purposes fall short of producing what is necessary for payment of the one, and relieving the other. If therefore we submit to the repeal of the Cyder-Bill, without endeavouring to prevent it, we shall deserve to suffer all the inconveniences of Debts and Taxes without end.

Perhaps our petitioning against such a repeal may, in one view, be as unnecessary as the Cyder-drinker's petitioning for it may be unreasonable. For it cannot be supposed that the Parliament will be influenced to comply with a demand so foolish and unjust. Yet, in another view, our petitioning may be very proper, (and in this view the more general and universal such Petitioning shall be the better) as otherwise we shall expose the Legislature to be traduced by petulant and scurrilous tongues, which will not fail to charge them with corruption, and pretend in proof of it that we ourselves are convinced the Law is an unjust one, inasmuch as we have nothing to say against its repeal. Let us petition then, if it be only to keep this topic of abuse out of the mouths of factious seditious demagogues.

Supposing, however, the Bill was to be repealed, what is to be charged with the duty which must be taken from the Cyder?

I wish

I wish the Applemen would tell us. And perhaps they have an answer ready, viz. that we may lay three shillings and six pence, or ten shillings more upon every barrel of Beer; two shillings or four shillings on every quarter of Malt, or two pence or three pence more on every pound of Hops. Any, or all of these, I suppose, will satisfy them very well; and if the Parliament thinks any, or all of these, more reasonable than the Tax on Cyder, I shall, as becomes a good subject, submit to it, and endeavour to get a house in some Cyder County as fast as I can. O! that my estate lay in some Cyder County!

But we are told, "that the Apple-trees are
 " all to be destroyed; that the woful havock
 " is begun, and by this time twelve-month,
 " if the Bill be not sooner repealed, will be
 " completed." I am afraid this is a mere humbug. Could I suppose it true, I would call my neighbours of Herefordshire and Devonshire good Commonwealth's-men, and think them disposed to do justice to us by taking on themselves an equal share of the expences necessary for the support of Government. This they can never do, while they drink Cyder, and Cyder is taxed but after the present rate. But let them drink any thing else, and I will acknowledge them fair fellow-subjects. I doubt though they will not continue so long. For they will soon find the difference, and fall to planting their orchards again. And (to shew I am not hardened in malice against them) I hereby advertise

tise the nursery-men to provide themselves of a good choice of Apple-trees, against the call which may be expected for them.

But, "if it is proper and reasonable that "Cyder should be taxed as well as Malt, why must this Tax be collected by Excise? For this plain reason, because it cannot be collected by any other way. I suppose our forefathers had as ill a will to be excised, as we can have. They had too more reason to be afraid of it, as being quite strangers to it, and not knowing but that the great horns it is drawn with, were to be used for bad purposes. So a prim lass of the town, when she pays a visit to the country, thinks every dairy cow which stands in her way a terrible animal; while the country girl, who has been used to stroke their paps from the time she could reach them, and to drive the beasts backward and forward from the time she was able to walk after them, knows them to be very harmless, inoffensive, humble creatures.

We have had experience of Excise, are grown familiar with him, and know that he is attended with none of those dangerous and mischievous qualities with which he has been charged. He has now lived among us these 100 years. What riots has he been guilty of? What outrages has he committed? Has he not always kept himself within the strictest bounds of decency and order? If any of his retainers have broke out and been any way obstreperous, have they not been immediately discharged? In the mean time has not the

state been served by him to better purpose than it could have been by any other officers? Has not that wickedest and most mischievous of all enemies to government, *Smuggling*, been more checked by him than it could have been by any thing else? And, if it has not been quite destroyed, has its preservation been owing to any thing else but Excise's having his hands tied up from acting freely against it? Why then do we pretend to be afraid of Excise? Why should we think he will not be, for the time to come, the same tractable, submissive, harmless creature he has been hitherto?

It was observed that our ancestors had as great aversion to an Excise as we can have, and had more pretence for such aversion. Yet they yielded to the necessity of submitting to be excised. And why should not we? Such is the mean selfishness of mankind, that no other method can secure the Government, the dues which have been given to it. Look to the Tax on Plate! how much does it produce fall short of what was expected from it! Enquire of that on Wheels, and you will wonder it yields so much. What occasions the difference? One is subject to the inspection of Excise, the other trusted to the honour of the people who are to make the payment. Instances they are, which, taken together, should teach us the wisdom of making much more use of Excise than we do.

And yet the worst circumstance, attending the Plate-tax, is its deficiency. But the want of Excise in many other instances is the

encouragement of Smuggling. And what a villainous race of vipers do we thereby encourage? Men who are professed foes to order, justice, and government! who are more closely connected with our Enemies than with us! and are always ready to give them the intelligence which may do us most mischief, and which can be given by none but such a sort of people!

Of this the Kingdom seemed very sensible in the war we waged with France sixteen or seventeen years ago; and, since that time, I think, severer laws have been made for repressing Smuggling. We find, however, that nothing of this kind will do. The lawless, licentious life, these fellows live, and the great gains they make to support themselves in it, will always keep up the party, while there are any commodities capable of being run in upon us; i. e. while they can find among us a vent for foreign goods, at a price sufficiently better than they give for them abroad. And they will always find such a vent for those foreign goods which we charge with high duties, unless more effectual means can be discovered for spoiling their markets than have been tried yet.

What then is to be done? Shall we take off the duties from foreign commodities? Or lower them till they will not afford encouragement for Smuggling? No, surely; for this would be flying to a remedy which is worse than the distemper it is to cure. It would be in effect taxing our own commodi-

ties so much the higher. The Supply necessary for Government must be raised. And if it cannot be raised on foreign commodities, which should be made to pay as much towards it as they will bear, it must be raised on those of our own produce. But this would breed many mischiefs. It would burthen our people, and tie them up to fewer conveniences of life ; — it would enhance the price of labour, and make our manufactures come dearer to the merchant ; — it would consequently give a great advantage to our rivals in trade at foreign markets ; and after all—it would enable our rivals, or perhaps even our enemies, to draw away our money for commodities which they would afford in our own markets cheaper than we could sell such of the same kind as are raised among ourselves. And this, by lessening the consumption of our own produce, on which the Supply was to be raised, would oblige us to tax some other article to make up the deficiency which would be thus occasioned.

Compare, in this view, the two commodities of Rum and French Brandy. The latter, for a year or two past, has been to be bought among us cheaper than the former. This certainly should not have been suffered, if it could have been prevented. For, as much as the Brandy has prejudiced the sale of Rum, so much have we been weakened, and our enemy has been strengthened.

The Peace, by lessening the hazard and expence of bringing our Rum home, may, perhaps,

perhaps, now have given it the advantage of its rival in the open market. But it may also, perhaps, have given Brandy an equal advantage, if not in the fair Trader's hands, yet in the Smuggler's, by opening the road over the water, and letting it have a clearer passage than it could have in time of War. And laying a higher duty on it would give those vermin still more advantage. And excised it is, as I expect to be here told, already.—The evil may seem then to be too desperate to admit of any remedy. And probably it is so, as the case stands with us at present. For the articles which are not excised give occasion for so much, and so gainful an employment of Smugglers, that they can afford and find opportunity to deal in Brandy and Tea in such a manner as it would be impossible for them to do, were other articles laid under the same restraints that these are. But the full discussion of this point would be too large a digression from my principal subject.

I beg leave, however, to propose a question suggested to me by the mention of these two opposites, Smuggling and Excise; the answer to which will, I am persuaded, highly deserve our serious consideration; viz. During the time that an Excise has been established in this Kingdom, which party has been guilty of the worst misbehaviour, that of the Excise, or that of Smuggling? I wish I could give, I wish I could see, in answer to this question, a complete catalogue of the crimes chargeable on the one, and on the other.

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Which list would be longest, and filled with the most shocking enormities?

I beg leave also to propose another question:—How much may the public revenue be supposed to have lost, since the year 1733, by rejection of the Bill which would have subjected *Wine* and *Tobacco* to the laws of Excise? That it has lost a great deal by *Wine* smuggled into the Country is not to be doubted. That it has lost more by *Liquor* made here, and sold as *Wine*, seems to be generally believed. How astonishing would be the account (would some intelligent friend of truth be at the pains of giving it on a fair calculation) of the many Millions we should now have been in debt less than we are, had that salutary Act passed into a Law! But let not these Millions, how many soever they are, be thought the greatest advantage the Public would have reaped from it.

The Lives and Health of its members are the chief consideration a Community can pay regard to. The wholesomeness of what they eat and drink, therefore, should engage its peculiar attention. Especially if they are given to be free in the use of any particular liquor, care should be taken that they may have that liquor as good as possible. What then must we think of our people's drinking such quantities of *Wine*, as it is called, brewed in the vintner's cellars? The number of people hurt by this practice cannot be known. That very many are can hardly be doubted. We know too it is a common practice with physicians to

pre-

prescribe Wine as a vehicle for their medicines, or as a medicine, and cordial itself, to industrious people who have lost their health, and would not afford themselves Wine on any other consideration than the recovery of it. How melancholy is it then to think that these poor people, when they have spent more than would subsist their whole family a day on Wine as a cordial for themselves, should be put off with unwholesome stuff worse for them than what they could have at home, without any extraordinary expence!

Now these grievances would be prevented by putting Wine under the care of Excise. As the vintners could then have no liquor in their vaults, but what came into them with a permit, they could not put off such stuff upon us for Wine as they do now. Nor would the Country, which buys all its Wines at a price which supposes they have paid the proper duty, pay the Tax for such an immense quantity more than the Government receives a farthing for.

Perhaps the check which will be given to these practices by the Excise on Cyder is no small motive to the clamour which many of the discontented make against the Law which subjects Cyder to such Excise. It is commonly said, that the vintners use great quantities of Cyder in brewing Wines; and, if they do, they will find themselves laid under some difficulty by this Law. For they will not now be able to get the Cyder so snug and so cleverly into their cellars, as they used to do.

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And thus the Law may be attended with farther good effects than it promises at first view; though these, as we have seen, are such as afford abundant reason for all well-wishers to their Country to be zealous for its perpetuation.

There are, perhaps, few of my readers whose own reflections will not suggest to them many instances of *Frauds* whereby Smuggling is encouraged, the fair Trader injured, and the Government defrauded, which an Excise on those articles would effectually prevent. Such, however, as would have better information on this subject than I can give them, may be pleased to read the book Mr. Janssen published a few months ago intitled—"Smuggling laid open, &c."

I know not, candid reader, whether you will not think that I have run into a digression. If I have, it is such a one as my subject led me naturally into, and I beg you will be pleased to pardon it.

But, whatever may be thought of the Excise in other instances, there is certainly no reason to complain of it with regard to Cyder. For it is, as far as Cyder is concerned, no other than the same harmless thing which has so long watched the Malt without doing any kind of mischief, or giving any kind of offence. It never, unless on some very reasonable grounds of suspecting unfair management, offers to come into your house without asking leave, nor but by day. And, when admitted, it quietly does its business, and de-
parts

parts in a very few minutes. And he does this only for two or three weeks, while the Cyder is making; and never offers to disturb you, during all the rest of the year. If he should chance to have any difference with you, your neighbours, the Gentlemen of the Country, the Justices of the Peace, are to determine it. If you do not care to have him so much as look into your house, you need not. It is but sending your mill to a neighbouring house, or your apples to a neighbouring mill, as we do the barley we would have malted to a neighbouring kiln, and you are free from having any thing to do with him. Or, if this would be more trouble than you care to give yourself, it is but paying five shillings a year for as many as you have in family above eight years of age, and he will not offer to come near you. And can five-and-twenty or thirty shillings a year (for not one quarter of the people who complain have more than five or six heads taxable in their family) be such a grievance?—But, be the grievance what it will, the greater the sum is, the more ungenerous and base it is for them to desire their fellow-subjects, who are already burthened heavier on their own account, to pay it for them.

I am not willing to charge these grumbling Gentlemen with disaffection to his Majesty, or an inclination to disturb their Country's Peace, though they make this unreasonable clamour in a manner that looks like it. For mankind are capable of thinking themselves
injured,

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injured, when a new burthen is laid upon them, be the imposition of it ever so reasonable or necessary. They find themselves less easy than they were, grow impatient, and complain. But generally time cools them, reason recovers its authority, and orders reflection to shew them the wrong judgment their first feelings led them into, and dispose them to resignation and acquiescence. And this, I hope, will, in a few months, be the case with my, at present, discontented Countrymen. They will see the unreasonableness of the complaints they now make. And though with us they lament, that the necessities of the Government oblige it to lay such heavy Taxes on its subjects, yet with us they will pay them chearfully; thankful that they are not the fruits of an inglorious War, or a slavish Peace, but the consequences of a War which has set our name high among the nations, and are accompanied with a Peace, which, if we do not abuse the advantages it gives us, will not fail of extending every day our Trade and our Glory, while it reduces, every year, our Taxes.

But what a horrid abuse of these advantages it is to squabble among ourselves! To throw dirt in the face of that Government, to whose prudence and humanity we owe them!

Bethink yourselves, O my Countrymen, what a gulf of distraction and misery you are running headlong into! Be the Peace as bad as you will have it be thought, quarrelling among ourselves is not the way to mend it.

it. But it is a sure way to render all its advantages useless to us, if it is a good one.

The cry one while was, that the men who made a Peace, which was not as good as it should and might have been, ought to feel our resentment. They have felt it. They have been driven from their posts: Have been forced to relinquish their great offices and honours, and content themselves with the income of their private fortunes, and the station of private subjects. The administration too is put into the hands of men who are certainly neither Scotsmen, nor Jacobites. What can we have more? *We*, I say, my friends, *we* who have no private interest to bias us, no particular turn to be served, either by one Statesman or another? *We* who must swim or sink with the fortune of our Country, and feel whatever misery She suffers, and can thrive only when She triumphs in prosperity and glory? Our complaint has been heard, our grievance redressed. Nothing surely remains (for the Peace must now be what it is) but that we compose ourselves to such quietness and duty, as may best shew our loyalty to the Sovereign, who so graciously condescends to be guided by the judgment of his People, and best improve the Peace, which we must abide by, to our comfort and happiness.

I am sensible that the declaimers, whose turbulent oratory has kept our passions so alert hitherto, will tell us, "It is not yet time for us to be easy." "That, though the men
" are

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“ are removed, the same measures are still
“ pursued, &c. &c.”

It is now evident enough what measures they mean ; and that the same complaint will still be made, whatever men are employed, and whatever measures are taken, till they and their patrons have forced themselves into the power they contend for, Then indeed they will be satisfied, and tell us, that we ought to be so too. That is, such of them as can get the power and places they want will be composed. But such as shall chance to miss their aim will continue the cry. We shall be still told, that men only, not measures, are changed. And we must open our mouths again, and tear our throats anew.

Can the Patriot and the Noble Duke, whom, for the greatest Part of his Life he has opposed with so much Vehemence and Acrimony, ever unite kindly ? They may eat and drink healths together ; but can they *guide* measures together ? Can either the one consent to employ a bribe, or the other trust to good management without a bribe ? Can they, both of them, so far lay aside the Statesman, and put on the good Christian, as mutually to forget and forgive what has past between them ? Will the vile and infamous aspersions with which each has bespattered the other, never boil up in their ambitious stomachs ? Is it possible that their reconciliation should be any other than that of Antony and Octavius, when they thought it necessary to join their forces, till, by the ruin
of

of the Senate and true Republicans, they could make the stage clear for the decision of their own differences?

Possibly the illustrious quondam *Compeer* of the *great Commoner* may be the egg to this oil and vinegar, the Lepidus to cement a short-lived temporary union between this Antony and this Octavius. But can the inflexible Patriot again permit his name to be joined with that of such a Lepidus, though it were but on a *Tobacco-box*? Can he forget the short turn he made from him, when they parted*? It is impossible that such high ambitious spirits, men so versed in the doublings of state intrigue, who have so often and so violently differed, should ever cordially unite, and pursue one reasonable end with disinterested views. Till after the battle of Philippi Octavius and Antony could unite their forces; —till Charles and all who wished well to him, were ruined, the Scottish Kirk, the English Presbytery, and Cromwell's Independents, could be sworn brethren; —and, till George is humbled, and his loyal adherents crushed, the present eating Junto may dip in the same dish.

* It has been said, that, during the union of these TWO, one of them thought he had brought matters to bear as he would have them, and spent a long evening in settling the whole plan with the other. But—see! What turns there are in the world!—The Right Honourable Gentleman had no sooner left his friend's house, than he went to another great man, and before day agreed with him on a plan very different from that he had just before settled with his *Compeer*.

But

But we know how well the two ambitious Romans and the Britons of the last Century agreed, when they had destroyed their common enemies; and may from thence form no improbable guess how long the malecontents of the present time will hang together, after they have surmounted the opposition with which they now contend. Alarming thought! that there should be a possibility of our falling from the height of glory and prosperity, where we are at present seated, into the confusion, anarchy, and misery, which followed the year 1648!

This however can be prevented by nothing but a steady adherence to the principles and practice of a dutious *Loyalty*. While we have the King at our head, we may be able to stem the strongest current of Faction, and at length force it to confine itself to its proper dirty subterraneous channel, while the stream of Loyal Affection, pure, unsullied, and undisturbed, wafts the gay vessel of the Commonwealth securely and merrily along the shores of peace, plenty, and happiness. But, should we suffer the King to be subdued and forced to resign himself up into the hands of the opposition, peace and tranquillity will be strangers to our coasts. Who will turn out the *Cromwell*, and shake the rod of iron over us, I cannot pretend to say*. But some perpetual

* I have said above—"I cannot pretend to say, who
" will turn out the CROMWELL, and shake the
" rod

perpetual *Dictator*, or arbitrary tyrannical *Protector*, must be submitted to: whose *Proscriptions*

“rod of iron over us.” But, since I wrote this, a pretty plain discovery has been made, who aims at it. Read the conference between his Majesty and Mr. Pitt. Could it have been thought possible for any man’s effrontery to have arisen so high, if we had not such a proof of it? Nothing less than the filling all Offices, and the *turning out* every one who dared to think differently from his Protectorship! It is not a Year since we had a great noise made about one member’s being asked to give his vote agreeably to his Patron’s Judgment. Now ——— are *proscribed*, and rendered *incapable* of serving their Country at once in one House, and no-body knows how many in the other. What will this man do, when he has the Army at his beck?—*Hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto.*

I have been so free as to remark on this gentleman’s *assurance*. To shew I have eyes to spy out *Modesty* as well as the other thing, I go on to the humility of his Royal Highness, the Duke of Newcastle, and the other *noble* personages who have condescended to list themselves under his *Sublime Highness’s* banner. How graciously do they “fall down and humble themselves, that the congregation of the poor may fall into the hands of their *Captain*!” Psal. x. 11. Well may they expect the blessedness promised in the other Scriptures to the *meek-spirited*! namely, “to *possess* the *Earth*.” Matt. v. 5. Psal. xxxvii. 11. But how come they to forget their Psalms so far as to leave out of their scheme the other part of the Text last quoted, and not wish to “be refreshed in the multitude of Peace? or, as in the last Translation, not *delight* themselves in the abundance of Peace?”

Another remark I beg leave to make on this conference, is, it shews that the principal consideration of the Faction which opposes the King, is no other than the acquirement of those tempting *Posts* and *Places* which bring *Power* and *Profit*. The Patriot it seems *could* not enter into his Majesty’s service, unless he was to have the

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tions and *Impositions* will make us know the value of the Liberty we now enjoy by making us feel the want of it.

But

“ the disposal of all Offices :” *i. e.* he *durst* not undertake the management of affairs, unless he had it in his power to keep those quiet, who, he knew, would open against *him* as well as against any other, if he had not a sop to stop their mouths with.

Does he think though, that, even if he was to be made *Grand Vizier*, and have the world to dispose of, he could content every one? Let the Reader think what answer can be given to this question, and *how much* quieter we shall be under Mr. Pitt, than we are now, if the grumbling Gentlemen are not *made* contented.

Some of my readers may not, perhaps, remember the account given as of the Conference referred to in this note so well, as not to have an inclination, on this mention of it, to read it again. They may, therefore, if they please, here read it as I found it in my Weekly Journal.

The following is said to be a genuine Conference between his M. and Mr. P.

HIS M. in Consideration of the present disgusts among his subjects, had, upon the death of the E. of Egremont, resolved to sacrifice all private resentment to publick union and peace; and there being then two of the great offices of State vacant, viz. Secretary of State and President of the Council, and two or more persons being willing to submit to honourable removes (one of whom was first Lord of the Treasury) his M. was in hopes that these great offices, which carry most of the power of the State, would have gratified the ambition of the Opposition. Accordingly a person was employed to sound the sentiments of Mr. P. the great leader of that party, who then answered with much condescension and moderation. Upon which he was sent for to his M. who repeated what is before related. Mr. P. upon this meeting supported himself upon a reasonable footing, acting rather the supple and humble character to draw his M. and his present administration

But “do we now enjoy Liberty?” Do not the Secretaries of State assume a power of

administration into a negotiation, as it will afterwards appear, merely to shake the confidence of the administration. What he chiefly insisted on was to be assisted by the able counsel of L. Bute; but he was answered that, as this could not be seriously desired, so it was also impossible, because that generous Nobleman had taken the resolution of retiring where even the voice of Faction and Malice could not pretend he had the smallest concern in public affairs, and this merely for the quiet of the Kingdom, though it was extremely inconvenient for his private affairs.—Here then the negotiation ended; Mr. P. desiring time to consult his friends till Monday, when he returned to his M. and, assuming quite a different style and manner from the preceding day, he said, That, after considering the state of the nation and the state of parties, he found, unless the following conditions were granted, he could not propose to enter into his M——’s service; viz. Himself Secretary of State, and to have the disposal of all offices. Lord T. first Lord of the Treasury with three of his friends in the board (among whom Mr. Wilkes is supposed to have been intended to be one) the D. of C. at the head of the Army, and the naming of a Secretary at War: Newcastle and all his friends to come in: Every man who was concerned in making the Peace, but Lord Halifax, to go out; and even all who voted for it, who might stand in the way of others who disapproved.

To which his M. said, ‘Sir, I believe, from my feelings as a man, I have offered as great sacrifices as ever a Monarch submitted to, merely for the good of My People, whose minds have been poisoned by ambitious and designing men: but you want to reduce me to such a situation, by disavowing my own act, and what my heart approves, and by giving up my friends to a vain and factious resentment, that I should be unworthy of ever having another friend: and you yourself must first despise, and then distrust, me. No, Sir, before I submit to these conditions, I will first put the crown on your head, and then submit my neck to the axe.’

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depriving

depriving us of it, whenever they see fit? I hope not. I should not commend his Majesty's Government, if I thought there was any reason to suppose they did. But I am persuaded there is no reason to suppose so. The commitment of Mr. Wilkes is, in my opinion, no sort of proof of it.

The Justices of the Peace often take up and send to prison men suspected of offences against the Law; and sometimes these suspected persons appear to be innocent; in which case I heartily pity them. But should I therefore complain of the Justices for assuming this power, or wish them to be deprived of it; or, because they pretend to a right of exercising such a power, should I think myself a jot the less secure in the possession of my Liberty?

Not at all! No! not though I should be myself the unhappy subject of such a mistaken exercise of Justice! sensible as I should be of the inconveniencies it would bring on me, I should not wish to see my Country abridged of a privilege so necessary for the security of her peace on a thousand occasions, and which so often proves the happy means of preventing mischief, and punishing wickedness. It is better that one honest man should suffer some trouble and inconvenience, than twenty rogues escape unpunished to do more mischief. Indeed should any malice, or any unnecessary petulance and severity, be shewn in this exertion of his Worship's authority, I would complain, and seek a proper redress in a legal way.

Mr. Wilkes

Mr. Wilkes has this remedy in his power ; but, it seems, his point is not to vindicate the Law, but to inflame the People : not to redress his wrongs, but to raise a mob. I hope though the People will see his designs, and of consequence heartily detest and abhor his practices.

His friend the Chief Justice has very plainly told us, that “ had he been a mere private Commoner, the commitment would “ have been not illegal.” Thus far then it is clear an appeal to the populace was neither necessary, nor proper. But, “ as he was ‘a “ member of the House of Commons, the “ privilege of Parliament should have protected him from such an attachment.”

I will not presume to dispute this point with his Lordship. That honourable House are the proper Judges of it, and will, no doubt, take cognizance of it, and do themselves and the Nation justice. Perhaps, if they find reason to assert this privilege, they will also see reason to condemn the abuse which has been made of it, and will shew themselves ashamed of a Member who pleads their privilege for a sanction to scurrilous factious behaviour ; who consults the dignity of the House so little as to call in the mob to judge of their privileges, and pretends his being a member of it shall protect him in abusing his Sovereign, and insulting the Government with impunity. But be that as it will ; to them leave we the decision of this point.

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Let us observe however the wonderful nicety there is, at least with respect to the case in hand, in the Chief Justice's distinction between a *breach of the Peace*, and a *tendency to disturb the Peace*.

Great capacities may perhaps see a *difference* between a *breach* of the Peace, and a *disturbance* of the Peace, though I can perceive only a *distinction*. But, should there be no real difference in the meaning of these two words, there may be a great deal of *judgement* in *changing* one for the other. For there are thousands of well-meaning men who, without thinking about the matter, will readily admit there is a difference from the manner in which his Lordship uses them; and thus they rest satisfied that, supposing Mr. Wilkes proved guilty of *disturbing* the Peace, he yet is not to be condemned for *breaking* it; and therefore the treatment he has suffered on a supposition that he had broke the Peace is so much the harder.

But it seems this is not all that can be said for him. What he is charged with would, if proved, be so far from a *breach* of the Peace, that it is not so much as a *disturbance* of it. It is only a *tendency* to disturb the Peace. The Lawyers, I hope, will excuse me, if I shew my ignorance in their Profession. I do not pretend to any skill in it; but endeavour to talk to men of plain understandings in a plain way of reasoning.

Be it allowed then that a tendency to commit a crime is not in the eye of Law (for Gospel,

Gospel, I suppose, will not be allowed to have any thing to do in the case) always attended with a guilt equal to the actual commission of it. But shall this construction be extended to cases of public concern, like that we are now speaking of, where an *endeavour* to raise a disturbance is all that is in the power of the Criminal, the actual making the disturbance depending on the concurrence of other people, on whom the Criminal's endeavours may possibly have no effect? Is not the man guilty of *treason*, who persuades his fellow-subjects to encourage a Pretender to invade the Kingdom, though no-body listens to his persuasions? Is not the Soldier guilty of *mutiny*, who tells his fellows that their Commander does not deserve their esteem and obedience, though none of them pays any regard to him? And does not then a Libel against the Government *disturb* or *break* the Peace, though no-body is influenced by the disloyalty it contains?

It is true it may be said of it, that it has only a *tendency* to disturb the Peace: for it may be treated with the contempt it deserves, and then the Peace of the Community is not disturbed by it. But no thanks are due for this to the Libeller. He did all that was in his power to disturb it, and surely is in reason to be counted a disturber of it.

If a man puts a lighted torch into the thatch of my house, with an intention to set it on fire, some good accident or other may quench the flame, before it burns down

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enough to do the mischief; and, if it is not seen till the danger is over, no commotion may be made by it. Yet shall not the Incendiary be deemed to have broke the Peace? I beg leave to ask his Lordship what he would think, or do, were he to find a fellow in the streets dispersing papers which called on the mob to rise, break into his house, turn his servants out of it, and insult himself,—if they did not set fire to his house, or pull it down about his ears? Would he shake his head, and say it was too soon to get the fellow committed, because all this had only *a tendency to disturb the Peace*? Would he stay till the mob was actually assembled, and his house broke into, before he would say, “Seize “and secure the fellow”? O Law! what a subtle monster thou art! How easily able when skilfully commanded to confound Reason, and baffle Justice! But, gentle Readers, it is likely you are ready to tell me, I might have spared most of my pains on this last subject. That you did not want so many words to satisfy you in so plain a case. That the scurrility of the *Monitors* and *North-Britons* is so infamous, and their misrepresentations so notorious, that you need nothing more than the Papers themselves to give you a contempt and detestation for the men who can either write or patronize them. That therefore you would have me make good my promise, and consider the Peace we have lately made. That it is said to be a bad one,
and

and you should be glad to find I can prove it a good one.

I say, *glad to find I can prove it a good one*, because every impartial disinterested person must be better pleased to find he has reason to be satisfied, than occasion to complain ; must rather wish to find that the Government he lives under has been administered in such a manner as to afford him the most reasonable grounds of expectation, that the enjoyment of his present comforts will be perpetuated at least, if they are not increased, than to see grounds of apprehension that neither his own, nor his Country's tranquillity, can be of long continuance.

And, Gentlemen, I do not doubt but I shall be able to give you this satisfaction: to convince you that the Peace we have made with France and Spain is such a one as must aggrandize us, and humble them: and that, considering the situation we were in at the time it was made, we have great reason to be thankful for it. I am almost ready to promise too, that it shall be shewn you, that, if every thing had been insisted on, and granted us, which the fault-finders say should have been insisted on, the Peace would on our side have been so much the worse for it. But raising your expectations too high would prejudice the cause I am to defend. I beg therefore you will only smile at this sanguine intimation, and pass on to a candid consideration of what I have to offer you.

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But, before I enter on the merits of the Treaty itself, it may be proper to consider how far it was necessary for us to make some Peace or other at the time this last was made; what may have been the consequences of our continuing the War, one or more years longer.

To have continued the War we must have raised more men and more money. Not less probably of either for the current year, than was raised for the last. Perhaps a larger proportion both of the one and the other would have been wanted. For the comparative inactivity of the years 1760 and 1761 leaves us no room to doubt but that the several Corps were much less deficient in men at the end of the Campaign of 1761, than they could have been at the end of the very busy one of 1762. The Campaign of 1761 cannot be supposed to be more destructive than that of 1762 in Germany. Let the loss of our men there be supposed equal in each of these Campaigns.

But what a difference must there have been in the loss sustained at Belleisle, and that attending the conquest of Martinico and the Havannah! The length of the voyage to the scene of action, the severity and difficulties of the service, and above all the unhealthfulness of the climate destroyed an immense number of men the last year.

Let it be considered that almost all our forces, except what was employed in Germany, spent the year 1761 in the healthful countries of Britain, Ireland, North-America,
and

and Belleisle; and this, except the trifling affair of Belleisle, quiet and undisturbed. But in the year 1762 they were either on the seas, where many perished; or in the unhealthy Caribbee islands, or the more unhealthy Cuba, or Portugal, which is well known to be a country not favourable to English constitutions. And this circumstance must have lessened their number much more than such as have never been acquainted with these countries, can be easily brought to believe.

I will not pretend to particularize the losses of the last year. But, if the accounts given of them in the news-papers have not been greatly exaggerated, it must be, I should think, the conclusion of every reasonable man, not that the War should have been continued, but that a Peace was to be clapped up at any rate, before the Enemy, dazzled by the victories and advantages gained by the blood of these brave Warriors, should perceive the weak condition they left us in.

Supposing however that our loss of men, in the year 1762, was not so immensely great as it hath been said to be, yet thus much seems very certain,—That our Forces wanted great numbers of Recruits to make them fit for service. Now where were these Recruits to be found, or at what price were they to be raised?

It has been said, in justification of the monstrous expence at which the Militia was kept embodied, that we could not in any
other

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other way have raised such a number of men, which yet we could not have been without. It has been said too, that the raising such Companies as were called *independent*, by giving Rank to Gentlemen who were to raise them in order to command them, helped the Country to many men who would not otherwise be prevailed on to enlist themselves.

If these assertions are true, and we were indeed put to such shifts two or three years ago, what must have been done now, when perhaps treble, or more than treble, the number of fresh men must have been provided than have been usually raised to recruit the Regiments for the service of other years? Perhaps the means already tried had been carried as far as they would go; and the Country has loudly cried out for want of the hands which the Militia and the several enlisting and recruiting parties had taken from it.

It may be questioned then, whether the Recruits wanted could have been procured at any rate. But it is no question, that, if they were to be procured, it must have been at an immense expence unknown before to this, or perhaps any Country.

It will be said perhaps by many who have either not considered these things, or would seem ignorant of what they are unwilling to acknowledge, " that the Conquests which we
" had made, would have rendered our
" future operations practicable with a less
" number

“ number of men than had been necessary in “ the years past.” But this would be an absolute misrepresentation of our case ; for in truth the conquests we have made, would have made it necessary for us to have provided more men than would have been wanted, if we had not those conquests to take care of.

It will not, I suppose, be pretended, that, because we have conquered so much, it would have been allowed the Government to sit still and contented without conquering yet more. No ; the very reason given for continuing the War, is, that we had it in our power to take every thing from the Enemy. It would therefore have been expected that we should have gone on attacking the Settlements they were still possessed of. We must then, I suppose, have attacked the island of Hispaniola, which, as it is well inhabited, and possessed, in its several parts, both by France and Spain, must be supposed an attempt equal in difficulty to both the Conquests we made the last year in those Seas, I mean Martinico and Cuba ; and, when we had reduced this island, we must have made ourselves masters of Porto-Rico.

Nor would this have been enough. We must have ordered General Amherst to pass the Apalachian Mountains, and traverse the vast Country of Eastern Louisiana to reduce it, while a Fleet sailed to possess itself of New-Orleans at the mouth of the Mississippi, and the useful harbours of Pensacola and Mobile. Florida too, it would have been said,

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said, must be taken in, to make our Settlements of Carolina and Georgia more secure, and prevent Fort Augustine from harbouring any longer Privateers to disturb the Navigation of our ships through the gulph of Florida; or we should have been called upon to overrun the Provinces of Mexico and Peru, take La Vera Cruz, demolish Porto-Bello and Fort Chagre again, or send our men once more to rot under the walls of Carthagená.

It would also have been said,—it was said before the Preliminaries were signed, that we must send a Force to Brazil sufficient to defend that Country from any thing the Spaniards, assisted by the French, might attempt against it from their Settlements in those parts. And no doubt the Government would have been complained of, if it had not conquered Buenos Ayres to secure the territories of our good Allies in its neighbourhood. The Portuguese dominions in Europe too, we know, must have been defended, and entirely by our hands; for the Portuguese have given us sufficient reason to be sensible they either could not, or would not, do any thing for themselves.

Here then would have been a great demand for men. The Corps first sent had indeed performed gallantly. They had in the strictest sense done wonders, and without suffering any loss worth mentioning from the Enemy. But in two or three months time their ranks were some how so much thinned, or the service was found to require so many more men, that

8,000

8,000 were drawn to the coast ready to have been embarked, if the Preliminaries had not been signed as they were. And how many more would have been wanted by the Spring is hard to guess. But we have little reason to think there would not have been a fresh and large demand.

Permit me here to observe farther that the misbehaviour of the Portuguese was so much worse than would have been thought possible, if no trial had been made of them, as to render a Peace much more necessary on that account; for it would have been the most extravagant of all Quixotisms to have undertaken the defence of that Kingdom with the men we could have sent from hence against the joint force of France and Spain, the unhealthfulness of the Climate, and the cowardice, treachery, and underhand hostilities of the Portuguese themselves.

I had like to have forgotten the South Sea and the East-Indies; for, though we had made ourselves masters of all the French settlements on the coast of Coromandel and Bengal, they were still in possession of the islands Bourbon and Mauritius, from whence they might have been very troublesome and mischievous to our East-India trade, the Fleet, which could not defend Pondicherry against Pocock, being an over-match for traders, as Capt. Fenner has proved, to his own and his owners cost. It would have been demanded, therefore, of the Government that these

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these two Islands should be reduced ; and great complaints would have been made, because Draper was suffered to come home, before he had taken them.

There would have been people too who would have talked of the South Seas, would have told us, from the account of Lord Anson's Voyage, what great things might have been done, if Cornish, after the reduction of Manila, had been ordered to the coast of Lima ; where a Squadron, sent round Cape Horn, might have joined him, and mastered the whole Country. They might have put Baldivia into the hands of the Natives, who mortally hate the Spaniards, and would not have failed to make their possession of it good against the greatest force Spain could attack it with. Here, we should have been told, “ would have been a fine vent for our manufactures. We should have had a Port always open to our ships, which would have been always received, with a hearty welcome, by a people who would have regarded us as their Deliverers.” A list would have been given us of all the rich Towns on the coast from Baldivia to Compostella ; and a computation would have been made of the money we might have got from them. The Riches and Trade of Lima, and Acapulco particularly, would have been displayed in such a manner as would have made many a well-meaning short-sighted Politician almost mad for vexation, that the Government took no care to plunder them.

Indeed

Indeed these services would have a very good effect if they were practicable, and therefore yield the better occasion for plausible harangues to such people as do not consider what reason and honesty would dictate, but what will turn the heads, and inflame the passions of ignorant, hasty men. If this is done, and a cry raised, the Incendiary's aim is accomplished. Mean while the honest, misguided Gentleman never asks where the men are to be found, who are to perform these services? He never considers that the utmost Force, which could be got together in the East-Indies, for so important a service as the conquest of Manila, amounted to no more than 2300 men. Of which number 820 were Seamen and Marines furnished from the Fleet, two Companies were Frenchmen, and most of the rest Natives of India. One Regiment and one Company of Artillery were all the English Landmen which could be provided for the Service; and that Regiment was so weak, that General Draper tells us it had lost (after the reduction of Manila, in which they suffered but little, considering what was done by them) since it left England 23 Officers, and upwards of 800 men.

It would have been well therefore if Admiral Cornish could have left men enough at Manila to keep what they had taken. He could certainly have carried none away with him, if he had been ordered to the coast of America. This however, is a difficulty our incendiary

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cendiary Politicians would easily have got over. They would have reinforcements sent him round Cape Horn, and perhaps would have complained that they were not sent off in good time the last Summer ; or they would have taken Porto-Bello and Fort Chagre, and ordered them over the Isthmus. They might perhaps have lost their fingers, toes, or eyes, in crossing the Andes. But no matter for that ; they would have had English hearts, and were therefore capable of doing every thing they were bid to do.

It would be endless to mention all the schemes these speculative grumbling Writers would have formed, and which would have been by some or others of them extolled as the only effectual means of reducing our Enemies to proper terms, and by some or others of their gentle Readers received as consummate Policy, and such as the Ministry, if they were not Knaves or Fools, could never have either overseen, or neglected.

I do not pretend that it would have been expected we should have made all the attempts I have mentioned within the compass of a year. But no one can say where mens expectations, or the clamours of those who want to raise a Faction against the Government, would stop. Every man who should be asked the question would probably have answered, that all these Services could not have been attended to at once. And yet many would have complained, whatever had been (as they
would

would have called it) neglected. And, if in any part which was not particularly attended to the Enemy should have gained any sort of advantage, the not having attended to that part would have been inveighed against as inexcusable. Particularly when the news came that the Spanish Governor of Buenos Ayres had taken the Portuguese Colony of St. Sacrament, we should have heard every tool of Faction bawling at a great rate, and charging the Ministry with negligence, incapacity, a wilful desertion of their Country's interests, and every other crime which could raise a discontent and ill-will to them in mens minds, because that Colony had not been protected.

Several of these Attempts would certainly have been called for: and particularly such to be made in the West-Indies or North-America as would have required a number of men at least equal to, if not greater than that we employed there the last year. But where could we have had them? They were not ready in America. The brave Fellows to whose services we owe the advantages of 1762 were fallen on the Lands they conquered, or the Survivors were barely enough to garrison the conquests they had made*. We

* I am told, in my Country Paper of Saturday Sept. 17, that, "Of 14,000 land forces which reduced the Havannah, there only remained when given back about 3,500; the proportion by natural death was about six to one of those killed in the siege. Such was the inclemency of the place to the constitution and health of British subjects."

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must have sent from hence then in February, or sooner if possible, a Corps of 10,000 men; and two months afterwards 8 or 10,000 more to continue our operations by supplying the places of those who should have fallen in our first Conquest, or been left to garrison it. Another Body of some thousands must have been sent to the defence of Brasil; and some more must, as hath been said, have been dispatched for Portugal. Services none of which could be neglected, whatever we were to do besides.

All this while no provision is made for Germany, where fewer than 20,000 British Supplies could hardly be sufficient; for the Cause must not have been starved there, whatever we proposed to do any where else. Should it be said we might have evacuated Germany entirely, and left it to itself, the Right Honourable Patriot and his Corps would have told us that, as America had been conquered in Germany, so our efforts in Germany must preserve and confirm it to us. And indeed, were we to have evacuated it, what *would this have been but* to have given the French liberty to present themselves on the borders of the Dutch Provinces, and terrify them into an immediate conjunction with them? The consequence of which could not have been any other than our being obliged to begin a War entirely new with our Enemies reinforced with the Dutch Armies, the Dutch Shipping, and the Dutch Ports. Neither this therefore, nor the other
Services

Services mentioned could have been neglected, if we would have continued the War to any good purpose.

But who will say 50 or 60,000 men could have been now raised? Or who will say that a less number would have been sufficient to have answered the occasions of the War?

What has been said hitherto has looked only to the want of Landmen. But we should have found ourselves perhaps under a necessity of either letting our Service cool, or of raising a large number of Recruits to our Sea-Forces. Our Fleets suffered as great a loss of men the last year as our Armies. Admiral Pocock, after the Reduction of the Havannah, found it necessary to send to England for an immediate Reinforcement of 3,000 Seamen. These I think, were got by hard pressing, and sent to him. But, when he had got them, he had not enough to bring home all the ships which were to come hither. Some were left behind for want of men to navigate them; and those which came home were in the utmost danger of being lost (many were lost) for want of their proper Complement.

I am aware that it will be here said the loss of these ships was owing, not to the want of men, but to the unexpected Easterly winds which attacked them when they were almost within sight of home. And this may perhaps be true, so far as that it may reasonably enough be thought they would have reached England very well, if those Easterly blasts had not prevented them. But who

will suppose that an English ship will not be able to beat up against a moderate gale so as to gain its port, and weather out even a brisk one, or bear away before it, if necessary, without distress, if it is properly manned? Read the account given of Lord Anson's passage into the South-sea, when he doubled Cape Horn, and then say whether any thing but the want of men could have reduced Pocock and his Fleet to the distress they suffered.

But we are not left to supposition in the present case, if the news-papers are to be depended on; for they tell us "The Fleet was badly manned." And why should not the news-papers be credited in this case as they are in other cases? It is from them the suppositions and reports which influence us to condemn the Administration are received, and why then should we scruple to receive their accounts, when they tell us what turns out in favour of the Administration?

Our Navy then was in great want of Seamen. How could we have got them? *Pressing*, it is to be feared, had been carried as far as it would go: for our Seamen, as well as our old Soldiers, were worn out. The Merchants, it was said, had, for some time, been forced to navigate their vessels with boys and foreigners, and think themselves happy if they could have two or three English able men in their crew. Where then could the Seamen have been had? They cannot, like mushrooms, start up thousands in a night.

Suppose

Suppose it possible to have found the number of men wanted for our ships, yet, if they had not been taught their duty by previous use and discipline, they would have served our present purpose but indifferently.

And yet, to have given any good account of the Campaign, we must have had more ships employed this year than were employed the last. There must have been an equal number appointed for the attack of Hispaniola, Carthagena, or any other of the Enemy's Settlements against which they were to be sent, as were used at Martinico, or Cuba. These two Conquests, at least Cuba, must have had some ships left to guard them; and a Fleet must have been stationed at Nova Scotia: for, I suppose, no-body would allow it to be excusable to leave Newfoundland exposed again this year as it was the last. There must have been, as was said before, another Fleet sent to protect Brasil, which last year was not wanted: and there must have been, no doubt, the same number of ships kept up in the Mediterranean, the Bay of Biscay, at home, and on our other stations as were thought necessary for the last year: and they all must have been recruited, or they would not have done their duty well. It would possibly too have been thought necessary to send a reinforcement of men to Admiral Cornish in the East-Indies, or the South-seas.

And if any of these services had been neglected, or, which as to consequences would have been much the same, they could not

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have been carried into thorough execution for want of men, we should, at the latter end of the year, have found ourselves in a condition much short of what the Gentlemen, who were for continuing the War, pretend we should have been in. And, if either the want of vigour in our proceedings, or any miscarriage, should have discovered our weakness, and thereby have afforded our neighbours, the Dutch, (who have given proofs plain enough of their looking with a jealous eye on our successes in this War) an encouragement to break with us; or, as was hinted before, if the French should gain an opportunity of frightening them into a rupture with us, we should then have wished we had not neglected the opportunity offered us of making peace in the year 1762.

And these considerations deserve to be attended to, even on a supposition that the Money, requisite for carrying on the necessary operations of the War, would have been procured. But, surely, it is questionable, whether it would have been procured or not; for the cry is general that Money is hardly to be found to carry on the commerce of private life. Where then could we meet with 15 Millions to serve the occasions of the Public? I say, 15 Millions, because the service of this year must have been of larger extent, than that of the foregoing. It has been shewn, that it must have been so, unless we had been contented with what we have got, and sat still acting only on the defensive without aiming at farther Conquests. But it has
also

also been observed, that this would neither have satisfied the expectations of those who were for continuing the War, nor have added any thing to the advantages we are now possessed of, with regard to making Peace.

I will take it for granted, therefore, that the War would have been pursued on some such plan as is above mentioned; and consequently that the Service of 1763 would have required more Money than had been wanted in 1762: especially, considering how many more men must have been raised both for the Land and Sea, and how much greater must have been the expence of raising them. Let me suppose then, as was said, that 15 Millions would have been wanted, and might have been procured.

Here, my Friends, it behoves us to consider what interest we must have paid for them. The Loan for 1762 was at 4 per Cent. irredeemable for 19 years, with an Annuity of 1 per Cent. for 98 years. No-body, I believe, will say that this was not a better bargain for the Lenders than an absolute 5 per Cent. for the time the Public should stand indebted to them, with a power of paying the debt off, or reducing the interest of it, whenever they should find themselves able to do so. Yet this Loan, till it was known the Peace was agreed on, was at a great discount; and no doubt can be made but that the worthy Gentlemen who get their fortunes by sucking their Country's blood would have expected a better bargain for the next money they were

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to advance. It is not, I suppose, known what Interest they would have had. Probably they themselves cannot tell to what an extent their Consciences would have stretched at the time the proposal should be made to them, and they saw their Country's necessities, and found it in their power to set their own price on the service they were to do her. Let us suppose however they would have been contented with 6 per Cent. The interest on 15 Millions, at this rate, would have come to 900,000*l.* per Annum, i. e. almost as much is raised by a Land-Tax of two shillings in the Pound.

But what Gentleman can think it advisable to entail such a Tax upon his Land, perhaps to the latest Posterity, on any other account than that of an absolute necessity; to secure the Liberty and Independency of himself and his successors, and transmit to them the Trade and Property he has enjoyed himself? And, if the Peace which we have made will do this for us, what could have been gained by any thing which may be called a better Peace, that could have been worth our purchasing at the expence of another year's War? I purpose by and by to consider what the Peace we have got will do for us, and what may have been expected more from any other Peace; but will first take the Liberty of begging that the Reader will reflect a little on the consequence of burthening the Country with an additional Tax of near two shillings in the pound on land.

It

It would be a remark little worth our consideration, if any one should say here, that the 900,000 *l.* to be paid for the interest of the money borrowed would not be raised on land, but on some other fund ; for the landed men would feel it, equally perhaps, whatever commodity should be taxed. The Land is not taxed now higher than it was 70 years ago. Yet Gentlemen find that their land will not maintain them better than it would if it paid twice as much Tax as it does, and they could have the commodities they buy as cheap as they were bought then.

Let it be considered too, what could be taxed to raise the Sum wanted of 900,000*l.* per Annum. Must we lay 9*d.* per bushel more on the Malt, or 18*d.* each more on the Windows ? For Cyder, it seems, must not be meddled with. It would be difficult to say what article can be taxed higher than it is without a danger of lowering the revenue it at present yields by checking and lessening the use of it ; as, it is said, has been in some degree the case with the additions made to the Duties on Windows.

There is another consideration too, which must have, I think, great weight with every one who is not void of Humanity ; I mean the men which the successes of such another year must cost us. It is much to be lamented that it should ever be found necessary to engage in War : either to aim at taking away another's life, or hazard our own so desperately. But alas ! the Corruption of mankind

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kind renders this in many cases inevitable. Some States will endeavour to wrong or oppress their neighbours; and those who are so attacked must defend themselves. The Party however, whose unjust ambition begins the fray, has a great deal to answer for. I wish the Princes and Statesmen of the world would think of it.

If a man who can neither pay the rent of his house, nor procure a maintenance for his Family, is tempted by this necessity to go upon the road, and in the course of Robbery, either by an accidental discharge of his pistol, or to secure himself from being taken, robs another of his life, we all agree he is not worthy to live longer himself.

Or if a cunning avaricious Attorney forms a scheme for defrauding his neighbours of their estates, and engages a simple fellow or two to assist him in his forgeries till they bring themselves to the gallows, while *he* triumphantly revels in the wealth gotten by the roguery for which *they* were hanged, do we not cry out on him as the most villainous of all rascals?

Yet, tell me! in what respect does the unworthiness, the baseness, the villainy of these men (exceed I will not say, but) in any degree approach near to the horrid malignity of that Prince's conduct, who, without necessity, plunges himself and neighbours in a War, either to enrich himself with the spoils of their Country, or to augment the parade of his Court, or raise what he calls his
Fame?

Fame? Such a Prince is guilty of an infinite number of villainies and murders more than either of the other Monsters; and how then can he be more excusable?

My humane readers will easily excuse my digression in this fally. They know, they feel how hard it is to think of the wanton waste which is made of Human blood without a warmth which on less interesting occasions would be not excusable.

But the subject would never better justify a warmth of expression on any occasion, than on that which I now use it. When I am speaking of the loss of my brave Countrymen which have perished in the present War. Men who, for their Bravery and Moderation in Victory, deserved Deification, much more than 99 in 100 of those to whom the Roman Senate decreed that Honour. Whose Souls were too great to pillage an Enemy that had submitted. Who fought for Liberty and Property, and wherever they conquered fixed their new subjects in a firmer and more secure possession of both, than they had ever enjoyed under their native Sovereigns.

Such were the Britons whom the late War destroyed. And is there a wretch to be found who will maintain that their blood was not too cheaply spilt, if we lost a man of them more than was necessary to secure us in the enjoyment of our Freedom, our Property, and our Trade? After these Points were well secured, what advantages could Conquest, Vain-glory,

Vain-glory, and Ambition hold out to us worth our sacrificing any more such men, though we should lose only the number that would perish in a Campaign unactive as those in 1760 or 1761?

It has been however shewn, I think, that it is questionable whether we could have carried on the War another year with any prospect of advantage, whether we could have found men to sacrifice. And, if we could not, what a figure should we have made at the end of the Campaign? If we had found ourselves at Michaelmas 1763 no forwarder in North-America than we were at Michaelmas 1762, if any attempt had miscarried in the West-Indies, if we had lost Portugal, or been beat out of Germany, and forced to submit to another Closter Seven capitulation,—if after this we had seen the French at the gates of Maestricht and Bergen op Zoom ready to overrun the united Provinces, if they would not join them,—what should we have said then? What terms of Peace should we have insisted on in those circumstances?

Let not an objector here urge that I have no reason to suppose my Countrymen would act with less bravery and conduct now, than they have shewn in several Campaigns past; for I do not suppose any such thing. I hope and am persuaded thoroughly that they would do every thing which bravery and conduct with their numbers could do. And bravery and conduct are known sometimes to succeed, where success could not reasonably be expected.

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ed. But the greatest bravery and the best conduct must be baffled at the long-run, when they are matched against an enemy much superior in numbers. Consider this last year's Campaign in Portugal. Could we on any occasion expect better Conduct, or wish for greater Bravery than was displayed there? The Enemies too which we had to oppose proved deficient in those two requisites, as much as we exceeded in them. And yet they gained ground on us, and shewed that the utmost efforts, which could be made against them by such a handful of men, would not be sufficient to prevent their overrunning the Kingdom. And I have shewn, I think, that there is a great likelihood we should have stood thus in comparison with our Enemies, had the War been continued through this Summer. It is not impossible therefore that we may have found ourselves at the end of it in some or all of the disagreeable circumstances I have mentioned.

But such a prospect is too disagreeable to dwell on. I will shift the scene therefore, and, instead of enquiring what sort of a Peace we should have made in a situation which (God be thanked) we are not in, will go on to enquire what Peace we might reasonably have insisted on, and ought to be contented with, in the circumstances wherein we found ourselves at the end of the last year.

It has been observed already, and neither reason nor humanity will suffer us to doubt of it, that nothing but Self-preservation, viz.
the

the defence of their Liberties and just Rights, will *justify* any Party's entering into a War. Nor, when it is entered on, will any other consideration justify the continuance of it. War is necessarily attended with the most shocking violations of Order and Humanity. A license and indulgence must be allowed to the fierce and brutal passions of one sort of men, and deep distress must be brought on the Weakness of another sort. Thousands of defenceless Families, who have never desired any thing more than to live harmless and quiet, disapproving and abhorring their Sovereign's unjust attack upon their neighbours, must be made to suffer more than in times of Peace is inflicted on the Families of the vilest Criminals. Murderers, Parricides, and Traytors to their Country are justly punished in their own persons. But their wives and daughters are not exposed to ravishment; their innocent sons are not forced away and made to bear arms against their Country. Their children are not starved for want of bread, not turned out to perish by the inclemencies of the weather, after they have seen their houses destroyed by fire. Yet even these miseries, and these miseries aggravated by a thousand dreadful circumstances, which it is shocking to think of, and many perhaps which I cannot think of, must be suffered by thousands of harmless industrious Families, whose misfortune it is to live in the Country which is made the seat of War. And can any thing, as was said

said before, but an absolute necessity, justify our bringing such miseries on our fellow-creatures, when they have done nothing to deserve it? Surely No. At all times whether before War breaks out, or during its continuance, it is our duty to live, as far as is possible, peaceably and inoffensively with all men. Consequently, when by God's blessing on our resistance we have got the better of our oppressors, so far as to find them disposed to forbear their hostilities, give up their unjust pretensions, and give us a reasonable security against such incroachments for the time to come, we are then, by every consideration which shews the unlawfulness of beginning a War, obliged to discontinue it, and agree to such terms of Peace as shall secure us in the enjoyment of our Liberties and Rights. From the time when we refuse such terms of accommodation the guilt of injustice and oppressiveness will lie on us. A Guilt which I pray God Britain may never be stained with. For all the Rapines, Cruelties, and Murders, which in the course of the War after this shall be committed, will lie at our door.

But have our Enemies given us a reasonable security that we shall remain undisturbed for the time to come? Let this now be made the subject of our enquiry.

Every body knows that the quarrel on which we began the War, was the incroachments the French made on our territories in North-America. They plainly shewed us it was their intention so to surround and con-

fine us, as to prevent our having any considerable part of the Trade to be carried on with the Natives of that vast Country. It would have been also in their power so to distress us in the Settlements we had already made, as that our continuing in them should have been very insecure and disagreeable; for they had projected, and well nigh, if not entirely, completed a chain of Forts, that would have given them an absolute command over the Indians which were in our neighbourhood, as well as over those which were behind them: the consequence of which would have been, that they might, whenever they pleased, have stirred up the spirit of that cholerick People to quarrel with us.

And when these troubles and the loss of their Indian trade had weakened *our* Colonies, and *their own* by the advantages they had gained were grown populous and rich, they might have rushed out of their Forts like a river that had broke through its bank and mastered the whole country. It was therefore highly necessary that these mischiefs should be prevented, though at the expence and by the sufferings of a War. Not only the Well-Being, but the very Existence of our Colonies depended on it.

In the event it has pleased God to enable us not only to recover our own country, but to possess ourselves of a considerable part of our Enemy's. And they have yielded for the sake of Peace not only to leave us in quiet possession of the Country we had conquered, but also

also to put into our hands another large and fine Country in which we had not gained the least footing, thereby making our Boundaries certain, our Territories as complete, and our Settlements as secure, as it is possible for them to make them. Here then the Peace has given us all the satisfaction we could demand.

But in the course of the War we have had many other grievances to complain of. The French have struck at our dearest Interests; have vilified us as Pirates; have endeavoured to arm our Allies against us, and have in fact engaged one of our most natural and most valuable Allies to break with us, and have done all they could to rob another of our good Allies of his Crown and Kingdom. They have also besides all this put us to an enormous expence of Blood and Treasure. Streams of Blood as brave as ever flowed in the veins of Heroes, have been shed, in defence of our Country against their endeavours to ruin and enslave it. And such quantities of Treasure have been expended as an Age will hardly be able to repair. And for these injuries, these losses and expences, it is reasonable we should have some recompence.

And a very considerable Recompence is made us. Our Ally who had been so unjustly attacked is indemnified. The Conquests which had been made upon him are restored, and his Fortifications, which had been damaged, repaired. The claims which the Enemy made on four valuable Islands, properly

ly indeed ours, but which for Peace-sake we had acknowledged should be as much at their service as our own, they have given up with regard to three, and in lieu of that which they retain they have yielded us another, of which they were in undisputed possession, of greater value. Here then is another point gained of the greatest importance to us. Dominica, which the French had so settled and fortified, as shewed they never intended to part with it; —St. Vincent, capable of equal improvement with any of its neighbouring Islands, but which they had also taken possession of, and watched with the most jealous eye to traverse every step we should take towards it;—Tobago, which, we have been told ten thousand times over, is so necessary to some of our Settlements in its neighbourhood, that they could not subsist but for the supplies they fetch from it;—and Grenada, rich in two harbours over and above the other particulars which render the Caribbees so valuable, are advantages which properly valued must be acknowledged to carry great weight with them.

The acquisition of Senegal and its dependencies is also an article of great advantage to us, whether the Trade it brings with it be considered as taken out of the scale of France, or put into our own. Useful and necessary commodities in great quantities are now brought immediately from our own Settlements to our own markets, which used to be bought of the French; and transfer a great deal of money

money out of our pockets into theirs. The trade of Slaves too, in which the French had at least an equal share with us, is now in a manner wholly our own; for the advantage which Goree can give them, though it cannot be said to be absolutely none, is yet comparatively next to none. But this particular may again perhaps come in my way, and therefore I shall at present say no more of it.

In the East-Indies too, our Enemies have yielded their Trade up to us, and renounced the pretensions they made to extensive Territories; and, when they shew themselves there again, it must be in such a manner as will lead the Natives to think we ordered them thither to shew out superiority.

The Fishery of Newfoundland also is in a manner left entirely in our hands; for that which the French retain can never either enable them to rival us at the markets, or render them independent on us for the use of it; it being certain that we shall always have the *power*, if they provoke us to entertain the inclination, to deprive them of it.

Another very considerable article in our favour is the renunciation which the two branches of the House of Bourbon have made of the Alliance they dignified with the name of the Family Compact. It was thought in William III^d's time a sufficient reason for kindling a War throughout the greatest part of Europe to dissolve the connections by which it was apprehended France and Spain would be united, if the two Crowns of those

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Kingdoms should at one time be worn by Princes of the same House. But no one, I believe, then apprehended there was a likelihood of any connection between them so entirely strict, as that which they entered into the last Summer. But, whatever it was, we have the satisfaction of seeing it entirely dissolved. We have quite annihilated it in a struggle of fewer Months, than the dissolving that before-mentioned cost us years; and the unjust measures by which our Enemies hoped to work our destruction, have through the blessing of God on his Majesty's Prudence and Firmness been made to shew their Weakness, illustrate our Power, and aggrandize our Triumphs.

We have another very considerable acquisition in the Peninsula of Florida, which the Spaniards have yielded up to us. It was observed before that France had obliged us with every thing in their power to make our situation secure and convenient. But, when they had given us all they had to give, still we should have a thorn left in our sides which would have been troublesome to us on a thousand occasions, while the Spaniards remained masters of Florida. But, having got this, we have every thing we could wish for. Our Colonies are secured, our Allies among the Indians freed from every care or danger, our Enemies among them humbled and entirely subdued, and our Possessions increased with fine Ports and a fruitful Country.

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The Spaniards too have renounced their pretensions to a Cod Fishery. It may be said indeed that they lose nothing by this renunciation, as they never pretended to fish, while they claimed a right of doing so. The renunciation, however, will appear to be a National Point gained by us, to every one who considers what is said about it in the Papers which passed between Mr. Pitt and Mr. Bussy, and my Lord Bristol and the Spanish Ministry, in 1761. We find it then treated by the three Courts, as a matter of the most serious and important consequence. And surely it was at that time, a matter of the greatest consequence; for it is clearly discernible by every one who will be at the pains of considering those Papers attentively, that this claim of Spain to a Fishery, with the other of Logwood, and their pretended claim to the Caribbee Neutral Islands, the two former were insisted on, the last hinted by M. Bussy, with a view of making these claims serve for a pretence, on which they might break off the Treaty with us, should we for the sake of Peace have agreed to the terms which France proposed to us. It cannot be doubted, but, that, after they had brought about their Compact with Spain, they were determined to pursue the War, in hopes that they should find us unable, however willing we may be, to continue it effectually, when we should have another powerful Enemy to oppose, and another weak Ally to defend. If it is asked, why did they

then keep on treating with us? I answer, to protract the time, that Spain might be the better provided for entering on the War: but principally, perhaps, in hopes they should have drawn us in, by the cession of Canada and the Fishery, to comply with their other terms, to the great disadvantage of our Allies, who would not have failed to complain of our deserting them, to make their own Peace, and perhaps to join against us. And when this had been done, when we had exposed ourselves as a faithless People, and lost our Allies, it would have been easy for them to have broke off the Negotiation, and renewed the War, under a pretence that we would not do justice to Spain, with regard to the Logwood Trade, the Cod Fishery, and the Islands; for they could not suppose we would tamely comply with her demands on these Articles.

The giving up these pretensions * then is a valuable concession ~~to~~ us, if considered in no other view than that of preventing and removing occasions of dispute in future times; and that to the Fishery, and the Islands, deserves

* It will perhaps, if I do not forestall their malice, be said in some Monitor, or North Briton, (for the writers of these Papers are capable of the lowest and most pitiful misrepresentations) that the Spanish claim to the Islands, which is here reckoned among the rest as given up, has not been given up, for it is not mentioned in the Treaty. Be it observed therefore, that there was no necessity it should be mentioned in the Treaty, as it does not appear that it was ever formally and explicitly insisted on; but it is effectually given up by the ninth Article. See Defin. Treaty.

serves not perhaps to be considered in any other light.

But allowing us the Logwood Trade, in the manner they have done, must be looked on as a Cession of another consequence. The importance of this Trade is known to be very great. It could not otherwise have found people to engage in it, on the terms on which it has been carried on. And if it could flourish amidst the dangers and hardships, which it has hitherto been exposed to, how must it thrive now, when those hardships and dangers are removed? And, if this wood is so necessary to our manufactures as to make it worth our while to allow the Cutters of it gains sufficient to run the risques which have attended their getting it hitherto, what an advantage must accrue to Trade from that reduction of its price which will follow the privilege of cutting it without these risques?

The demolition of the Harbour and Fortifications of Dunkirk is another National Point gained to us. The importance of this concession may be estimated from the unwillingness of the French to comply with the stipulations of former Treaties concerning it, — from the mischiefs done our Trade by the Privateers of that Port in every War, — and from the apprehensions raised among us by the Armament made there by Thurot in 1758; circumstances fresh in every one's memory. This harbour in time of War generally, if not always, found us employment for a considerable Fleet to watch it. A service which,

now the harbour is destroyed, will not be wanted, if the French should quarrel with us again. But I shall not discuss the importance of this article any farther here, as the *Guardian* is a book every-where to be met with, and the Reader may, if he pleases, see a plain, but true and interesting, account of the mischiefs Dunkirk is capable of doing us, while its harbour is kept open, and consequently the great advantage we ought to think it to have that harbour destroyed, in the 28th Paper of that work.

In this Treaty too our Ministers have obliged France to drop their demands of an Indemnification for the damages they sustained, by the capture of their ships off Cape Breton, in 1755; a point which in the year 1761, when Mr. Bussy was treating with Mr. Pitt, they insisted on with all the haughtiness they could shew.

They have also agreed to reimburse us the money we had expended on the prisoners we had so long maintained. A sum which the papers, I think, told us, would amount to 2,000,000*l*.

Now my impartial friends, what grounds are here for clamour? What just reasons for complaining, that the Peace is not a good one, or, as some people affect to express themselves, that it has done nothing for us?

But there are people who find fault, because they are determined to do so. Nothing can be done to please them. It is not their judgment of what is, or is not, for the good
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of their Country, which directs them in their censures, but their passion, their prejudice, their ambition, or their pride. Accordingly, if the men they are pleased to oppose send any troops into Germany, they roar out against Continental connections, and lament that their dear Country's Wealth and Blood should be lavished away to serve a paltry miserable Electorate. Let the administration be shifted into their own hands, or those of their friends, and tho' twice the number of men, and three or four times the quantity of Wealth, be sent thither, it is all well. Germany is the spot on which our Enemies are to be fought, the field in which America is to be conquered.

Now, my friends, it is not at all needful to enquire here which of these different assertions is best supported by reason. The inconsistency and contradiction so flagrant in the conduct of the men, who, to serve their occasions, can act these different parts, is what I would point out, as the only key, by which we can be let into the true meaning of what they say. I am aware this is not a new remark. It has been often made; but it is of such importance, that it ought always to be made, when this subject is talked of. If it can be shewn that a Witness has prevaricated, and, to serve one turn, has sworn to-day, that a thing is *white*, which, to serve another turn, he yesterday swore was *black*, his evidence will have little regard paid to it by an impartial Jury.

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But this is not the only instance in which the Malecontents have thus prevaricated. Whoever remembers the strain Mr. Pitt's friends talked in, when Mr. Buffy was in London, and compares it with what we have heard from them since last Autumn, will have before him instances more than enough of it. One is so striking a proof of byassed views, that it cannot be too much insisted on, and therefore ought not to be here omitted tho' the Public has been made acquainted with it before.

It is the change of that Gentleman's discourse, who in 1761 published the pamphlet, called — “A Detection of false Facts, &c”. That he must be very well acquainted with the Sugar Islands, their produce, their interests, and the benefits arising from them to the Countries on which they are dependent, is acknowledged; and therefore we had reason to think ourselves obliged to him for giving himself the trouble of correcting the mistakes we had been led into, and teaching us how to rate them according to their true value. It was particularly seasonable, and convenient for us, to have our notions thus amended, when the Government was negotiating a Peace, by which, from a just sense of the true interest of their Country, they were determined to retain Canada preferably to Guadaloupe, tho' the prejudices of the People were likely to determine for Guadaloupe preferably to Canada. Here it was a worthy exertion of Patriotism to stand forth, and tell
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the wrong-judging Multitude, “ that they did “ not know their real interest”. “ That they “ would never wish for more Sugar land than “ they had already, if they knew what to wish “ for”. And, “ That they would never consent to part with Canada, if they were well “ acquainted with the value of it”. The arguments he used, in support of these assertions, the reader may perhaps remember, and probably think there is reason in them.

But what reason could lead him to discover, in the year 1762, that all he had told us, with such an assurance, in 1761, was absolutely void of truth, — “ that Canada was a “ barren desert, a mere *Bagshot-Heath*, not “ worth the keeping ; whereas Guadaloupe “ was of an inestimable value ?” It is not to be supposed, that he knew more either of one place, or the other, the last year, than he did the preceding. But, in 1761, Guadaloupe was to be given up by Mr. Pitt, and therefore the doing so was to be applauded ; in 1762, Guadaloupe was to be given up by Lord Bute, and therefore the doing it must be condemned.

In the mean time, what a pretty compliment is paid to us, by whom he expects to be believed in the tale, just as he pleases to tell it ! We are not, it seems, at all, to regard what Metal the coin is made of, which he pleases to pass upon us. It must go current, if it has his *face* on it, tho’ copper, or brass, instead of gold and silver. Surely, the man is absolutely destitute of common modesty, and
thinks

thinks we are absolutely destitute of common sense !

And yet, my friends, by this talker, and other such-like talkers as he is, have many of us been misled to oppose and affront the best of Sovereigns, and think ill of a Peace, which relieves us from the burthen of an insupportable expence, saves the lives of thousands of our brave Countrymen, and gives us the prospect of a glorious and lasting tranquillity.

But these disappointed wretches, when they cannot deny but that the Peace brings with it considerable advantages, yet to keep up the clamour cry out, “ It has not procured us all “ the advantages it might have done”. For instance, as was observed, they say,

1. “ That, if we were to give back to France either Canada, or the Sugar Islands, we should have kept the latter, and returned the former”. I will not now enter into a detail of the arguments which have been urged, in favour of one side, or the other, in this question. I may presume most of my readers have already seen them, and such as are enough acquainted with the subject to be able to pass a proper judgment on what has been said concerning it, do not, I think, want any thing more to give them satisfaction on this head.

But I beg leave to consider the comparative value of these Countries, by setting them in a light they are not commonly placed in, tho’ it seems to me much the best for enabling the generality of my Countrymen to pass a judgment

ment on it. That is, I would have them considered, with regard to that staple Manufacture of this Kingdom, on which our Trade is allowed chiefly to depend, I mean the Manufacture of Wool. That this Manufacture is of the greatest importance to our welfare, is undeniable. That the exportation of our Wool is a great detriment to this Manufacture is generally believed; and that this exportation of the Wool is owing to our growing more of it, than we can work up and dispose of, seems very clear.

To remedy this inconvenience, it has been proposed, that all the Wool grown in these Kingdoms, more than we have a demand for, shall be bought up, at the public expence, and destroyed: And the Legislature itself appears to have thought a provision of this kind not inexpedient, when it enacted the burying in Woollen; for the terms of this Act are such as shew, that it was not contrived with a view of serving any Manufacture, but merely to promote the consumption of Wool: Whatever then contributes to the consumption of Wool, is a matter of public benefit; and the greater the quantity of Wool is, which is disposed of in any Trade, the more beneficial that Trade is to the Nation.

Compare now the Sugar Islands and Canada in this view. The former lie under the Sun; and apparel is worn in them, not for the sake of warmth, but of decency. Accordingly the Cloaths they require are such as are made of Silk, or Thread, or Cotton, or light Stuffs,

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or superfine broad Cloths, which take off but little Wool; and the last article, which takes the most Wool, helps England off with little, or none of that, which it chiefly wants to dispose of, namely, that of her own growth; for those superfine Cloths are mostly, if not altogether, made of Spanish Wool.

But Canada is covered with Snow for six or seven months in the year, and therefore wants the thickest coverings: no Stuffs, no Blankets, can be too coarse for that Climate, and an Indian, who travels five hundred miles in the Snow afoot to hunt Beaver, takes off more English Wool than a rich Sugar-planter, who cannot stir one mile from home, without a Coach, and half a score Negro footmen.

To which of these Countries, therefore, ought we to give the preference? To that which takes from us those commodities only for which we are dependent on our neighbours, or that which demands large quantities of the commodity we grow ourselves, and want to dispose of?

2. Another complaint is, that we have not made an advantageous partition of the neutral Islands; for *neutral* the Islands of Dominica, Tobago, St. Vincent, and St. Lucia were allowed to be by the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, in 1748. Yet, *neutral* as they were called, and certain as it was (perhaps) that we had the best title to them, the French had made Settlements in every one of them: whence it may be concluded that the Island they made their chief Settlement in, must be, to them at least,

least, the most desirable. Dominica, therefore, must be, in their judgment, the best, for they had settled and fortified themselves there, much better than in any other of these Islands.

Another rule whereby we may form a judgment, which is of most use and value to us, is the account given of them before the present War, when men had not the temptations which their Party and Prejudices now lay them under to speak of them, any otherwise than as our Country's interest is affected by them. Now, as the other rule proposed shewed us the Island of Dominica for that which the French most valued, so this will point out Tobago for that which is capable of being the most useful, and consequently should be esteemed the most valuable to us; for it has been often, and through a long course of years, represented as of absolute necessity to us. Barbadoes could not support itself, we have been told, without the refreshments it was served with from it. Dominica, therefore, as being that the loss of which the French would most sensibly feel, and Tobago, as that which our necessities rendered most useful to ourselves, are the two which a good English Minister would naturally first chuse, and accordingly they are by this Peace secured to us.

As to St. Lucia and St. Vincent, neither the French, nor we, have ever set any great store by them. There was, indeed, a Patent granted to the Duke of Mountague, in 1722, for settling them both: And then, more in
opposition

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opposition to us, than; as hath since appeared, for any use they had to make of them themselves, they pretended that they belonged to them, and that they would settle them: and it seems our Government did not think them worth a serious dispute, and accordingly relinquished the Settlements they had begun to make. Now indeed we are told St. Lucia is worth all the rest; and the pretence on which it is said so is, that it has a good harbour. But an impartial observer cannot doubt, but that, if it had no harbour, the same preference would be given to it by the discontented, and some other pretence made use of to justify their doing so. The true reason however of their valuing it so highly now is certainly that it is the Island left the French. Had either of the other three been relinquished to them, our clamourers would have raised the same kind of Cry, and would have been in the same manner joined in it by all who love to complain, more than to be thankful.

“ But is there not a good harbour in St. Lucia? I suppose there is. And there are two good harbours in Grenada, which are already improved and fortified. Grenada too is said to be possessed of several other *natural* advantages, above any other of the Caribbees: as, “ that most of the trees and fruits, which “ are met with in these Islands, are better in “ Grenada, than in any of the rest.” That “ Fish, Fowl, and Cattle, Rivers, and Springs “ of fresh Water, and Pits of salt Water, are “ here all excellent and abundant:” and “ that this Island is always free from those “ dreadful

“ dreadful Hurricanes which the others so often suffer by.” What harm is done then, if St. Lucia be relinquished for Grenada? What the harbour in the former may be is perhaps only guessed at; what it is in the latter has been proved, and it is known it will answer our occasions extremely well. Our largest Ships may be careened there; our largest Armaments collected, and, when they are there collected, the wind will always readily carry them to any of the Islands, which the French retain, or any of the Spanish Settlements in the Gulf of Mexico. As to the harbour of St. Lucia, the French have never yet made any considerable use of it, nor should we perhaps, if it had been ceded to us, while Grenada was in our hands.

Here then, to do justice to our Peace-makers, we should give them commendation. But alas! there are people, who, when Justice opposes their pride, or their ambition, say to her, “ We chuse none of thy ways.”

Accordingly, in spite of her remonstrances, they find fault with the determinations of the Treaty with regard to the coast of Senegal: although we keep possession of the whole Country, except a barren unhealthy rock; * and all the Trade, except such as may be procured

* It has been said, that, by returning Goree to the French, we in fact give them every thing they had before, and lay our possession of Senegal at their mercy; but this is one of those many tales which have been told us about the Peace, without the least foundation in truth or probability. Mr. Adanson says, that Goree is 35 Sea

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procured under the greatest disadvantages imaginable; for they have neither Fort, nor Factory, on the Continent near the River Senegal; and therefore can gain but little respect among a People, who cannot be made to feel *their* power, while they are kept in strict awe by the Settlements we possess among them.

In the same despite of Justice, do the grumblers harangue against the regulation of the Newfoundland Fishery: though we have driven them from all the Stations, where they could employ themselves in the most profitable branches of this business. The Fish, we are told, which are caught in the Spring are much better than those which are taken afterwards in the Summer; and on this account, as well as that they first reach the Markets, sell by much the best at them. Now this part of the Trade is all our own. Our Rivals

Leagues from the Island of Senegal, which lies in the mouth of the River of that name: that is, it is upwards of 120 of our miles, if measured straight upon his Map, and much farther by Sea round Cape Verd, which is the only way, by which there can be any communication betwixt one place and the other; the Forests which yield the Gum are 100 Miles farther removed from Goree, than the Isle of Senegal: and "Galem, says Mr. Adanson, is upwards of 700 Miles above the mouth of the "River (Senegal) and the principal place of Trade for "Gold, Slaves, &c." He says too, the Island of Goree itself "is a low narrow piece of land, and a small "but very steep Mountain, the whole the sixth part of "league in length." *Vid.* Adanson's Voyage to Senegal, P. 148 and 103.

What now must the Reader think of the men who can pretend our Settlements or Trade in Senegal are in danger from the French at Goree?

have

have not a Bank on which they can carry on this Fishery. They are confined to the Summer season and the deep Water. Consequently they cannot either catch the most valued sort of Fish, or have any to dispose of, at the time when they would fetch the best price. Indeed it may be questioned, whether they will have any to dispose of: for, under the disadvantages they must grapple with, they must acquit themselves well, if they catch Fish enough to supply their own demand.

I am told in my News-paper, that the French Monarch has published an Edict, forbidding foreigners to bring any Fish into his dominions; and the retainers to Faction have represented it as injurious to England, and a proof that France aims at aggrandizing herself more than ever. Whereas, in truth, it is a proof of nothing more, than that the Fishery of France is on a much worse footing than it used to be, and that they apprehend their neighbours will be able to undersell them in their own markets. As matters stood formerly with them, they knew they might safely leave the markets open; their own people had advantages in the Fishery which would enable them to undersell any who should pretend to rival them. But now, when they are deprived of these advantages, it is necessary for them to make laws to keep us from serving their own mouths: How absurd then must it be for us to entertain any fears, that they should rival us in other markets, when they are forced to be so much upon their

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guard to prevent our underselling them in their own!

Compare the situation the two Nations are in, with respect to this Fishery, with their situation before the War; the French had then all the Summer Fishery they have now on the great Bank and the North coast of Newfoundland, with the whole Gulf and River of St. Laurence, all the Coasts of Cape Breton and St. John's, and the other Islands and Coasts in and about that Gulf, besides the Spring Fishing on all these Coasts, — while we had only the Summer Fishery on the great Bank and the Southern Parts of Newfoundland, and the Spring Fishery on the Coasts of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia: and in this last mentioned, which was the only Spring Fishery we had worth'speaking of, the French were near enough, if they pleased, and were at leisure for it, to share with us. They were therefore then possessed of many advantages in the Fishery more than we were, and yet they could never gain by it any thing like an equality with our Marine: What then must be thought of the men who tell us, that now they will gain a superiority to us in the Marine by what is left them? That is, they will be able to reap ten times as much advantage from the Fishery now, when they have not the half of what they had before, as they could ever gain from the whole of it; and that we, with more than double the advantage we had before, shall not be able to make so much of it. For this is really the
case

case on a comparison betwixt us: We who before had little of the easy profitable Spring Fishery, have now almost, if not quite, all of it; they who had by much the greatest part of it before, have now little or none of it; they too are deprived of all but the most laborious part of the Summer Fishery, and their Fishers must every Summer be carried thither from Old France: for Newfoundland is no harbour for them but in the fishing Season; and the Islands of Pierre and Miquelon will neither invite nor maintain any considerable number all the year round.

It must however be acknowledged, and it is as much as can be acknowledged in the case, that the Fishery allowed the French is better than none at all.

I should not have mentioned the East-Indies in this place, but to observe that notwithstanding our neighbours have consented to trade in the finest part of that Country only under our sufferance, and in the other parts to acknowledge for Sovereigns of the Country the Princes we had set up in opposition to *their* interests; though they have utterly renounced the pretensions they had to considerable Principalities, and have obliged themselves to squeeze their good friends the Dutch by the throat, until they disgorge the Sugar-plums they had given them to swallow; — yet there are men to be found who will say, “ We have given up every thing in the East-Indies.”

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Let us now briefly review the account as it stands betwixt us and Spain ; for objections are also made to that part of the Treaty which concerns them. It is said, “ that we have “ meanly submitted to destroy the Fortifications we had on the Logwood Coast.” And why should we not destroy them ? What use could we have for them, when without them we are sufficiently secured in the Rights they were raised to protect ? From the moment they became thus unnecessary they would of course be neglected, and moulder to nothing. And, if to procure not only a security for the Cutters, much better than what their Fort could have given them, (for their Fort could not have protected them from all alarms and disturbances which they are now without it protected from) but also for their Traders a liberty of fetching and carrying away the Logwood, without any kind of interruption, — if, to procure these advantages, we have consented to demolish a paltry Fort or two, a few years before they would have fallen of themselves, have we done wrong ?

But what are these Fortifications which are to be destroyed ? Perhaps, no other than what may be rebuilt and enjoyed, without any offence given to our neighbours, under the names of Houses, or Magazines ; for in those wild Places, and among such licentious people, even Houses ought to be places of some defence ; and the very notion of a Magazine, which is not secured against lawless attacks, is absurd : especially when it is considered how
much

much exposed the Trade and Effects of the Inhabitants on such a coast must be, without some precautions for their security against the ravages of Pirates.

And here, my impartial friends, indulge me with the liberty of making an observation, which, I hope, will engage you to applaud, rather than condemn, our Peace-makers on this Article. It is generally remarked of British Statesmen, that they suffer themselves to be duped by those they treat with, and be put off with fine words, while they give up solid advantages: but here the *finesse* is of our own side; we have the solid advantages adjudged to us, while the Spaniards are complimented with the fine words; and was it not right and prudent, if they would be so satisfied, to sacrifice a few civil words to their vanity in a promise, from the performance of which, when made good to its utmost extent, we shall be never the worse, and they, saving the point of a chimerical honour, never the better?

Another thing complained of is the restitution of the Havannah; it is said, that, “while we kept that place in our hands, Spain would have been at our mercy.” I believe she would, and perhaps she is yet, though the Havannah has been restored to her; but of that by-and-by. It is here to be considered, that the restitution of the Havannah was certainly an article without which no Peace was to be had; we are, therefore, by this complaint brought back to the Point we argued above, viz. whether it was not advisable to

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agree to a Peace any thing like a reasonable one, rather than continue the War. And, if it has been proved that it was not advisable for us to continue the War, this objection is already answered.

But it may be further answered by observing that it is fairly questionable, whether the Country they have given us in exchange for it, viz. Florida, be not an acquisition which in the situation we are in should be thought more eligible by us than the Havannah; for this Port in time of Peace would be but of little use to us, though the want of it would greatly distress Spain. We have no Fleets to rendezvous here which cannot well meet in any other place. All our Trade, which can ever come near it, is from Jamaica, the Logwood coast, or our new acquisitions of Louisiana and Florida; none of which, except perhaps the Logwood Trade, would often put into it. We must notwithstanding keep there at all times a force of 6 or 7,000 men; and, besides the expence of maintaining these, must frequently lay out large sums in keeping up the Fortifications.

And what advantages should we have to answer such expence? It would puzzle the wisest of the Grumblers to tell us; for the riches of the place would soon evaporate, the inhabitants would leave it, and the buildings moulder away, when there would be no longer the usual resort of Shipping to it. If they tell us their land would well pay for cultivation, alas! what would that do for us? We
have

have already much more land than we can occupy. It would be much wiser for us to cultivate the lands we have, and people the Islands we possess already well, than to look out for more.

Many weak and distant Settlements are no strength to a State; they are a burthen to it, and often prove its ruin. If a State would receive any benefit from her Colonies, she should keep them as close together, and as well peopled, as she can. Thus they will be able to defend themselves, and perhaps upon occasion spare some of their strength for the defence of their Mother Country. Like the children of a labouring Family, which, while they are infants, or infirm, are a burthen to their parents, and lessen the subsistence they would otherwise have for themselves; but, when they are grown strong, and able to work, contribute to their parents living more comfortably than they could without them; thus Colonies, till they are grown strong, weaken their Mother Country. They must be nursed at the expence of both men and money. And, the more such any State has upon its hands, the more inconveniencies must it suffer to support them. And, the weaker those which are able to shift for themselves are, the less advantage will she be able to derive from them. But such as are well settled and brought to full maturity repay the care which was spent upon them in their nonage with a tenfold increase.

Now

Now have not we already Colonies enough for our little Island to establish, maintain, and improve? Which of them is not capable of farther improvement? And which of them would not better pay for it than Cuba, where there is a large frontier to defend, a most maliciously disposed people to govern, and where the unhealthfulness of the Climate must be expected to devour so many men? For it ought to be remembered by such as think on this subject, that unhealthful Countries cannot be settled without a peculiar detriment and disadvantage to the Nation which would settle them. They cost a much greater number of men, and continue longer in their state of weakness and infancy, than such Countries as are healthful. The Havannah and its environs therefore are some of the last places we should wish to settle in; since, as the last summer sufficiently shewed, they are as unhealthful as any Country can be supposed to be to British constitutions.

It would have been madness to have entertained a thought of settling there; for all the men and money which would have been employed for that purpose, must have been withheld from some other place, where, it might reasonably have been expected, they would have yielded double the advantage. In the mean time Florida, i. e. while we should have kept the Havannah, and Spain should have retained this Peninsula, would have continued a thorn in our sides, a nest of privateers to annoy our Trade, a receptacle of fugitives from our Colonies,

Colonies, and therefore an encouragement to all worthless servants in them to turn Thieves and run away, and a spur to the choler, resentment, and rage of the Indians about us. The acquisition of this Country therefore must be a very considerable advantage to us, whatever it may be in itself.

The people who are resolved to find fault say, that Florida is a barren part of the world, absolutely unfit for cultivation, and absolutely incapable of repaying the industry of inhabitants. But authors who have given an account of it, before the last Peace was made, have told us that it is a fine Country, blessed with a fruitful soil and a pure air; that it produces all sorts of timber, shrubs, and herbs, in great perfection, particularly Mulberry-trees and Vines; that all sorts of grain may be cultivated there with great advantage; that the meadows bear good burthens of excellent grass, and feed cattle extremely well; and that no Country is better watered, nor more plentifully stocked with fish and fowl.

Here then is a Country worth our looking after; not only well furnished with the common necessities of life, but particularly adapted to the serving us with commodities which we are much in want of, but know not how to raise in the quantity we want them *,
on

* Georgia has raised Silk, and, it is said, of a good sort; but, though the Colony has been now these 30 years established, the quantity of Silk we have had from it is very inconsiderable. As to Wine, I do not know they have ever sent
any,

on any of the lands we were masters of before this Peace.

Florida then, to a people in our situation, is more eligible for cultivation than Cuba. Because,

1. The one can furnish us with nothing but what we either have, or may have, in any of our island plantations; and the other is capable of serving us with commodities we cannot have elsewhere, though it is a great disadvantage to us to be without them. Because,

2. Florida is a healthful Country, and the people we send thither will go as far as double or treble the number sent to Cuba. Because,

3. Whatever is done by us for settling Florida is adding strength to our present Colo-

any, either to England or any of its Colonies. Should it be urged that Georgia is as capable of raising these commodities as Florida, and that the only cause of its having failed to do so hitherto has been the want of proper management, without which they can no more be raised in one place than in the other, I am not inclined to dispute it. But still even in this view Florida becomes necessary to the improvements we want, though they were to be made in Georgia; for, if security and tranquillity be not absolutely necessary to the settling any improving and Country or Art, they are highly necessary to the doing it well and speedily. Settlers flock to a place of security in much greater numbers; they marry and multiply therein much more freely, and pursue the improvement of any Art or Manufacture with much more attention and spirit, than they do in the neighbourhood of an Enemy, of whose attacks they have reason to be in continual apprehension. But this security and tranquillity could not, we know, be given to Georgia any otherwise than by the acquisition of Florida.

nies which it joins, as it will be a Frontier to them, will impress the greater awe on our Indian neighbours, and will be capable of contributing to their defence, if they should be attacked. Whereas what is done at Cuba will be lost, as was before observed, to some other place where it would be of more service, and, after the most that we could do for establishing the Colony, it would perhaps remain in a weak helpless state, much more a burthen than an advantage to England.

The Port of the Havannah may be sometimes of use to us, but of very little in time of Peace, as was before observed. The Ports of Florida, Augustine, and Pensacola, with that of Mobile in Louisiana, will be perhaps of more; for none but trading vessels, when we are not at War, would be likely to use those Seas. And for them it is more convenient to have little Ports in several places, than to be confined to one, however large. The Harbours of Mobile and Pensacola may also be of use to them, when that of the Havannah can be of none. Let a ship from Jamaica have passed Cape St. Antonio in the Isle of Cuba by running West, and she will then have a great way to bear up against the trade winds, before she can get into the gulf of Florida; and, supposing that in this part of her voyage she should have suffered damage, she might reach Pensacola or Mobile, whither the wind would readily carry her, when she could not reach the Havannah, which the
wind

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wind would blow her away from as much as
from the gulf.

As to the time of War, the Spaniards from Pensacola and Augustine might have distressed our trade as much as they can from the Havannah; for their cruizers from the Havannah might be checked by ours from Mobile and Pensacola. But we have no station from which we could have conveniently restrained the cruizers of St. Augustine. It is too worth our attention that, at all times, whether of Peace or War, the Indians of Florida have accustomed themselves to murder the Crew, and seize the Cargo of any English ship which has been so unfortunate as to be wrecked upon their coast. An accident too common in that difficult navigation. And this mischief will be prevented, for the future, by our being masters of this coast, and consequently able to command the Indians.

If it be said that in times of War we might have made our preparations for invading the Enemy's settlements in the gulf of Mexico with more advantage at the Havannah, than we can at any other place, even this may be reasonably questioned; for the chief thing to be attended to, in making such preparations, is the setting down the men to their work in good health and spirits. But this can hardly be done, when they are to be collected at an unhealthy place. They who come first must wait for those who are to join them, perhaps two or three months; and so long a stay in such a place may be fatal to numbers of the Corps. Convenient therefore as the Havannah

nah may be for such a purpose, in point of situation, it may on account of its unhealthfulness be very improper for it. But, be its convenience for such a purpose what it will, Port-Royal in Jamaica may boast the same; for, as the wind in those seas blows always from the East, a Fleet would be little longer sailing to any part of the gulf of Mexico from Jamaica than from Cuba. Port-Royal in Jamaica therefore would be as serviceable * for the

* I submit it to the Gentlemen who are skilled in these affairs, whether it is not a much readier and safer navigation either from England or North-America to Port-Royal in Jamaica, than to the Havannah in Cuba. If it is, and I believe these Gentlemen will not hesitate to tell us it is, it cannot be made a question, whether it is not by much the most convenient and proper place of the two for us to collect any Armaments in we may have occasion for in those parts?

The reader who has not an opportunity of consulting any maritime Gentleman on this question, may perhaps meet with information enough to satisfy him in the letters which Sir George Pococke wrote to the Admiralty from the coasts of Cuba, dated July 14th and August 16th, 1762. In the former of which he will find that the Passage the Admiral chose from Antigua, and consequently the Passage he would have chosen from England to the Havannah, through the Streights of Bahama, was attended with great difficulties and hazards.

The Admiral had been so prudent as to send Captain Elphinston before him to reconnoitre the Passage, who executed his commission extremely well, but found it necessary to keep Fire-lights on each side the Passage for direction in the night. The Admiral too was so fortunate as to have "fine weather and little current through all the Passage". By which care and advantages he got through, God be thanked, extremely well.

But,

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the purposes of making armaments to act against the Enemy as the Havannah in Cuba, if the ports of Florida and Louisiana, which are more healthful than those of either Island, cannot be made to answer this end better.

“ But keeping the Havannah would greatly distress Spain in her commerce with the Indies.” It would so; but why should we wish to distress her in times of Peace? Spain, as a neighbour and ally, is of great use to us; and, were the two Nations rightly to cultivate their mutual interest, might be of more. Spain is a rich Kingdom, and with its dependencies consumes a much larger quantity of foreign manufactures than any other Kingdom upon earth, and pays the best price for them: Yet, with all her riches and fine territories, she is unable to defend herself against her powerful neighbours; England particularly and France are either of them vastly an over-match for her; it is necessary for her therefore, in case of a rupture with either of these neighbours, to engage the other
on

But, as we find in his letter of August 16, the Fleet from New-York, i. e. the first division of them, had a man of war and four transports wrecked at the very entrance of the Streights, though, as far as appears, they had as good weather as the Admiral; and that they met with no more misadventures, and that the second division arrived safe without any, seems to be entirely owing to the prudent measures of the Admiral in sending proper guides to meet them and conduct them to him.

And now I beg the reader would think, if all this caution was necessary, in so fine a season as our Fleet last Summer fortunately had, how great must be the Danger, whenever the weather or currents shall refuse to favour us!

on her side; and with which of them would it be most natural for her to connect herself? Not with France, which, as she has to her cost experienced, is not able to give her Trade and Colonies effectual protection; nor will France take off the commodities of Spain in those quantities which England would take of them; nor ought Spain to be so easy, with regard to any designs which France may have of making incroachments on her, as she may reasonably be in that respect, with regard to England; for the genius of the latter is Trade and Peace. We are not to be easily provoked to enter on a War, nothing but an absolute necessity can force us into it; and with the Spaniards we can have no temptation to quarrel, while they be good friends to us; they have nothing we can wish to get from them, now they have given us Florida, which, to be sure, was wanting to make our territories in North-America complete: indeed it is our interest rather to protect *them* in the possession of their rich Settlements than to take them for ourselves; the riches they yield would do us more good when circulated to us through Spain, than if they were brought directly from the Mines to London.

The Spaniards therefore, when they were making a *compact*, would have shewn more wisdom in making it with us, than with their other neighbour; and it will be our wisdom first to encourage Spain to connect herself closely with us, by shewing her that we are as willing as we are able to be her best Friend, and

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then to encourage her American commerce by all means which are in our power.

Nothing of this however could be done, while we retained the Havannah. The Spaniards would have felt and resented the loss, and would have watched for opportunities of revenging it: in the mean time our Trade with them would have suffered greatly; the *Family Compact*, if not professedly renewed, would clandestinely, according to the spirit and intent of it, have been brought into execution. Every power which pretended to rival us would on that very account have been encouraged by them, so that we must have paid for the Havannah by the loss of our Trade with its old masters; this however would not have been all it would have cost us; the Fortifications must have been repaired and maintained, and a garrison of 6, or 7,000 men always kept there at a very great expence; the expence however would probably not have been the worst part of the affair, for one, or, if we are to judge by the experience of last Summer, two thirds of the garrison would every year have perished; such would have been our gains from the Havannah, had we kept it!

“ But it would have kept the Spaniards in
“ awe.”—Probably enough, but what should we have been the better for that, if it had withal changed them from useful friends into harmful enemies? Its having been in our hands will be sufficient, no doubt, to keep them a long time in awe; they have found
that

that it is not impregnable by us, and therefore will be careful not to provoke us to attack it again; should they do so, it is not to be questioned but, if our courage and conduct be the same, we shall make ourselves masters of it again at a little more expence of men and money than it would have taken to keep and maintain it a single year after the Peace was concluded; for it cannot be supposed that the Spaniards will have it at any time better provided than it was in the year 1762.

I have been the more particular on this subject, because it is the Point most insisted on and most plausibly made out by the fault-finders: but, you see, the truth of the case at last appears to be only this, that the keeping the Havannah would in time of Peace be of infinite disadvantage to us, and in time of War we need not be long without it.

A good deal of the reasoning used on this Subject is applicable also to the bustle made about giving up Martinico and Guadaloupe; for, should we have retained them, it would have put us to a great expence of men and money to have garrisoned them, and kept them in due subjection; whatever attention had been paid to them by us, would have been wanted by some of our other Settlements; and the French by drawing away their people from these Islands to Hispaniola would soon have been in as good a condition of rivalling us in the Sugar Trade from that one Island as they are now from all of them; we should have divided our forces in such a manner as would perhaps

have weakened us much, while they by concentrating their forces would have found themselves stronger.

One circumstance there is attending these Islands, which I am tempted particularly to point out again to my reader's notice; I dare not however, until I have begged he will give me leave to do so, because it has been suggested already, and because his own feelings will lead him to think of it: but the lives of my brave Countrymen are too precious in my eyes not to appear the first objects to be regarded, when I am thinking of any thing less than Religion and Liberty. These indeed are of value enough to be bought at any price, but, when the enjoyment of *them* is secured, my soul burns with indignation and contempt of the men who can propose to sacrifice the lives of Britons to vain-glory, ambition, and exorbitant power. This makes me think myself excusable in repeating the mention of the unhealthfulness of these Islands; Martinico and Guadaloupe must be kept by large garrisons, if we retain them in our hands; and they are known to be so unhealthful to English constitutions, those especially of newcomers, as garrison soldiers must always be, that it is not to be doubted but in three years time one half of every Regiment which should be sent thither would be lost.

These are observations which, as they cannot be gainsaid, would prove, one would think, to every body's satisfaction, that we
have

have made such a Peace as we ought to be very thankful for.

But there are people who, having been disappointed in their ambitious views, are resolved to find fault; if Truth with her attendants Modesty and Sincerity oppose themselves to their pretensions, they will in return bid defiance to Truth and all that belong to her. Hence that rigmarole of absurd incredible scandal, that jumble of inconsistent contradictory calumnies by which the Public has been abused. The disappointed wretches in the bitterness of their anguish having vented not what they knew, or supposed to be true, but what they thought would raise a ferment in the minds of those who could be prevailed on to believe it; and hence too that last resort of theirs, that groundless pretence, but impenetrable buckler to them, because it cannot be demonstratively confuted any other-wise than by experience and time, "that the Peace will not be a lasting one."

It must be acknowledged that no one can with certainty say what will, or what will not, be lasting in a world like this, which we live in: but is there any thing to be collected either from the terms of the Peace which we have made, or the situation in which our late Enemies are placed by it, which shews it to be in the least probable, that they will soon find themselves disposed to break it? So indeed the discontented say: but, my Friends, it has been shewn how their *say so* is to be

understood; let us therefore judge for ourselves.

I suppose it must be the French with whom this new War is to be waged, for we may safely trust that Spain will not find herself disposed to quarrel with us again soon: indeed, as was observed but now, if we had insisted on keeping the Havannah, she must have remained discontented, and ready to catch at any thing like an opportunity of shewing her resentment; she would have felt her wound every moment, every motion she made would have fretted it, it would have grown every day more sore, until the incessant anguish drove her to madness and made her desperate. Thus after a few years unprofitable Peace we should have been obliged to engage in a formidable War; for a War is always formidable which is to be carried on against a People made desperate by sufferings; their fury amply supplies the want of a thousand other advantages, and often gives them a superiority and success, where the probability seemed to be greatly against them.

But now the Spaniards have no such provocation; they have indeed made us Cessions which *we* may justly call great and important, but, to *them*, what they have parted with was of little consequence; they had little benefit from it, while they kept it; and will not feel any loss of it, now it is in other hands. Nothing therefore is done to fret them; their Trade, while they are at Peace with us, will be carried on with the same advantage it used
to

to be : and, if the experience they have had of French Friendship and English Enmity, should engage them, as probably it will, and certainly in true policy ought, to connect themselves more closely with us, they will find their Trade, their Power, and their Prosperity much better established than it has lately been, and will not therefore be easily persuaded to break with us.

But, should the Demon of Discord find means of rendering them blind to their real interest, and engage them after some years again to rouse our Fury, and dare our Power, we shall not need probably to put ourselves to any greater expence of men and money to regain the Havannah and reduce them to beg another Peace, than what our Trade with them will have helped us to. Thus the Peace we have made is such a one as not only is the most likely to prevent a War with Spain, but is also the best means we could have taken of preparing ourselves for it, when we shall be forced into one.

But “ France will not be so easy, she must
“ feel the loss of what we have taken from
“ her, and will be daily fretted in the manner
“ we have supposed Spain would have been,
“ had we kept the Havannah in our hands ;
“ she therefore will be ready to break with
“ us on any occasion that shall offer.” This
cannot be denied ; nor could it have been
helped ; our neighbours of France have been
so constant in their enmity to us ; they have been
so steadily watchful to improve every circum-
stance

stance which seemed to give them an opportunity of distressing us, that Humanity itself could not forbear tying up her hands as close as it was possible for her to tie them; and, if we have not done this, it must be owned that we have not done all we should have done.

And now I shall be told, no doubt, that I have given up the cause, for more might have been done than is done: "Martinico and Guadaloupe might have been retained; we might have excluded them from the Fishery entirely, might have denied them any share of the Slave Trade, and refused to restore them Pondicherry.

These points might indeed have been insisted on, but, as hath already been observed more than once, without being granted us; We should never lose sight of this circumstance, when we are considering the Peace; for the finest most plausible talking in the world may be no more than an *ignis fatuus*, a Will of the wisp, sent by the Demons who envy our happiness to lead us wrong: these enemies to our tranquillity know very well that it is a weakness too incident to mankind to be led away by plausible representations, without taking time to consider the foundation there is for them; and therefore they hope that, on their shewing that the French have any thing at all left them, we shall immediately take fire without considering that the question is not what we might wish to strip them of, but what we could bring them
to

to give up for the sake of an immediate Peace.

For it has been shewn, and I hope to your satisfaction, that an immediate Peace was what our interests required; it has been shewn too, that what they have left them is of no great consequence, either for enabling them to distress us, or aggrandize themselves; it has been also observed that, for what we have returned to them, or left them in possession of, they have yielded to us the very large and fine Country of Eastern Louisiana, and the fine Island and Harbour of Grenada. The latter of which not only abounds in the natural advantages which recommend the other West-India Islands, but also affords us a harbour with all the conveniences we have hitherto wanted in those Islands. The former removes our Enemies to a sufficient distance from the Settlements and Forts which have made them so troublesome and formidable to us; they will henceforward be deprived of the advantages and opportunities they have in such an unneighbourly manner abused to the distressing our Colonies, incroaching on our Territories, corrupting our Allies, and intercepting our Trade; they will no longer be in a condition of impressing an Awe and Dread of their power on the natives of the Country; they will no more be able to persuade them they shall soon overrun and possess themselves of our Settlements; and consequently will no more be able to influence them to quarrel with us, and carry Devastation and Murder into our Colonies: that they have often done this is well known; and alas!

we

we have a sad proof of it in the accounts we now receive from that Country.

Think not, Reader, that I have either not observed, or not felt, these sad accounts, tho' I write what you have just read; for this breaking out of the Indians, mischievous as it is, is, I apprehend, no sort of contradiction to it. That these people should be prevailed on to break out into the most horrid excesses, whenever they have a prospect of getting plunder, and gaining praise from their brutish and barbarous Countrymen, and their more brutish and barbarous Allies, is not to be wondered at; nor is it any thing strange, that our Enemies, when they had it in their power to shew them that Spain had joined France against us, should be able to persuade them that such an Alliance would be too powerful for us to struggle with.

It should not therefore surprize us, that these people, whose notions of Honour and Virtue are not calculated to restrain them from these ravages, should think they had a fine opportunity of committing them with impunity; not questioning but the efforts of France and Spain, in other quarters, would draw off our Attention from them, if these Powers did not send them aid, to support them in their ravages: such, I say, may well be supposed to be the notions inculcated and effectually impressed on these Savages, during the last Winter, by emissaries from our Enemies in those parts, when they might be totally ignorant of the Peace which was concluded: and,

and, when they knew of the Peace, they might not have it in their power, if they had Humanity enough to entertain it in their will, to undeceive the poor wretches soon enough to prevent their breaking out in the manner we have heard; possibly the emissaries might be ashamed, or even afraid, to present themselves to an assembly of Indians, and acknowledge, “ that
“ all they had boasted to them of their Master’s power was vain and groundless; and
“ that, instead of treading on the necks of
“ the English, he was reduced to the necessity of laying *his* head under *their* feet, and
“ forsaking at their bidding all the land he
“ possessed near them, and retiring to hide
“ himself from their faces beyond the river.”

It is possible, I say, that the insults, to be apprehended from Indian resentment on such a Declaration, may have prevented our Enemies offering to undeceive the poor creatures, whom they had drawn into the snare, and occasioned their leaving them to proceed in the error they had been led into, until they were too late made sensible of it by the destruction it brought on them.

But, however this may be, little doubt is to be made but that, when they see our men pursuing them from one mountain to another, laying waste their fields, burning their houses, and carrying their children away prisoners, — while the French and Spaniards, without moving a hand in their defence, are quietly retiring from their fine Settlements, and going to found new ones in distant desarts; — when they see this, as (God blessing us) it
may

may be expected they soon will, if they do not even now, they will no doubt be forward to acknowledge their folly, and submit themselves to our mercy; and, whatever terms shall be granted them, they will long remember, with resentment, contempt, and abhorrence, the perfidy and baseness of the People, who could by false representations draw them into such a snare, without making the least effort to help them out of it. Thus, unhappy as this breach is, with respect to the poor people who suffer by it now, it may in the end prove the means of making, not only the Indians who are concerned in it, but also all the rest of them who shall see the effects of it, much firmer Friends to us, and more determined Enemies to France and Spain.

In the mean time these two Powers, by the cession of Florida and Louisiana, are removed to a very great distance from the Frontiers, to which they used to be so troublesome: if they would disturb us, they must pass the River to attack us; they cannot dispute the boundaries, or settle themselves on our territories, under a pretence, that they have a title to them, unless they can change the River's course. Every incroachment they can pretend to make on us, must be a barefaced act of hostility; and every armament they make, must be on the farther side of the River which runs betwixt us; they cannot therefore undermine us during a pretended Peace, or attack us unprepared with open War.

I have not, honest Reader, presumed to trouble you with all the observations, by a great many,

many, which may be made to shew, that Louisiana is a very valuable cession to us: it seemed indeed so very plain a thing, that, had not the mention of the new rupture with the Indians led me to speak of it again, I should have passed it over, with the slight mention made of it in Pag. 64. It may not however be improper to observe here how peculiarly seasonable and happy the Peace is, with respect to our North-American Colonies, which have been now so unexpectedly attacked. Had the War continued, and the French been at liberty to have given the Indians their aid and assistance, they would have been very troublesome and formidable Enemies; as it is now, it is only, it may be hoped, another Cherokee War. Horrid indeed! and fatal to to many brave men and industrious families! but of short continuance: checked as soon as we could turn our faces towards them, and quelled as soon as we were at liberty to march our men against them.

It may be observed too, that this rupture would have been another call for men * from England, had the War been continued. It is said, that General Amherst, (and I think before this Indian War broke out) after the return of his Regiments from the Havannah, found them so weak as to make it necessary for him to send us a demand for a reinforcement of 2,000 men; What number then must we suppose would have been wanted by him, if the War had continued, and

* See Page 40, &c.

and the Indians had been supported by France and Spain? How much greater numbers must have been sent him, if he had been ordered to attempt the conquest of Louisiana?

But to return to the Grumblers. — It appears from what has been said, that they tell us what is very false, when they assert that we have given the French all for nothing; we have returned *them* what it would have cost us a great deal to keep, they have given *us* what we could not have been well without; I say, *given us*, because we were not in possession of Louisiana, nor perhaps, in the weak condition to which our Fleets and Armies were reduced, could we have got possession of it. To have attacked it would have required a long, difficult, dangerous, and expensive march, in which the nature of the Country would have given the enemy great advantages, and made it almost impossible for our Army to have either carried sufficient subsistence with them, or provided themselves with what they would have wanted, without carrying it with them; and this, perhaps, was the reason why General Amherst continued so long unactive, suffering the Year 1761, when his Troops had little or nothing else to do, to slip away without adding the glory of conquering Louisiana to that of having conquered Canada.

Our Peace-makers then have got a great deal from the French, and probably as much as they could be brought to part with; they have

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have therefore done every thing for us, which could be expected from them.

Can any reasonable man, seriously think, the French could have been brought to part with more? Let every reasonable man answer this question to himself; but let him think withal, how wicked a thing it is for any one, who is convinced in himself, that they would not have given up more, to pretend, for the sake of misleading other men, and distressing the Government of his Country, that they would.

I have been told, that a Right Honourable Gentleman, who gained great credit by his Negotiation at Paris, in the year 1761, declared, when the merit of the Preliminaries was debated in the House of Commons, that the observations he had made, when he was at Paris, on the temper and spirit of the Court there, would have led him to think, that it was hardly to be expected they would have given up so much, and that he could not believe it possible to have brought them to give up more. Let it not be thought, therefore, that I contradict myself, when I say, it was incumbent on us to leave the French as little as we could, and yet maintain it is a very good and advantageous Peace we have made with them, though we have not stripped them of every thing.

But to return to the question, from which we seem to have digressed; will not they, fretted at the loss of what we have taken from them, and enabled, by what we have left them, to recover

recover themselves very fast, soon be ready break with us again? I think not: For what they have left them, will not enable them to recover themselves in a few years.

The Settlements, which are restored them in the East-Indies, will for the present be a great drawback on them; they have these Settlements to re-establish at an expence of men, money, time and patience, equal almost to what was necessary for the establishing them at first. Pondicherry will not be restored to its former state under some years if it ever be. I say, if it ever be, because, it will not be easily done, without the goodwill of the Natives, whose contempt they have incurred; and of the Nabob, whom they have opposed, and who will therefore consider them as Enemies.

I do not mention, in this place, as an argument that the French will not easily re-establish themselves in the East-Indies, the opposition we may be able to make to them by our influence over the Natives; this might have been mentioned as a proof of the Policy of the Ministers who made Peace for us, since it may be argued for them, that they had no reason to insist scrupulously on professing to retain what they may so easily withhold with one hand while they pretended to give it with the other; it might also, as observed, be urged for a proof, that it would not be in the power of our Rivals to re-establish themselves in those parts soon, since we may stir up the Natives to give them such an opposition

opposition as would baffle all the efforts they could make for gaining either Trade, Credit, or Security. But I hope my Countrymen of all ranks abhor such indirect practices; the French may have been shamefully guilty of them, with regard to us: Witness their management in North-America, after the Peace of Aix la Chapelle; but let us scorn to be guilty of so base a conduct. We have shewn our superior Humanity in prosecuting a War, by forbearing to retaliate their cruelties and devastations, when we had it in our power to do so; let us shew, that we are as much superior to them, in the cultivation of the arts of Peace by scorning to attempt, underhand, what our public professions disavow. The opposition the Prince and Natives of the Country will probably make to them, without our meddling in the affair, and the other difficulties they will have to encounter in the course of their re-establishment, will prevent for a long time their putting themselves in those parts into a respectable condition, and therefore we need not apprehend their being soon in a formidable one; in the mean time, till they are fully established, the settlements there will be a lessening their power at home, and in other parts; for the men, the money, and the shipping used for them, will be so much taken from other services.

Let us now consider, what Goree can contribute to the recovery of their Power; the Trade they had on the River Senegal is entirely lost to them, and that on the River

Gambia we were in possession of before; and the little they can get on the Coast between those two Rivers must be carried on under great disadvantages; perhaps all the profit they can make from it is the serving their West-India Plantations at a rate something easier than they could get them otherwise, and this certainly is an advantage, tho' not such a one as can contribute much to their being formidable.

For their West-India Islands cannot henceforward be to their Mother Country the profitable and serviceable Settlements they have been hitherto; they will not be able either to raise their commodities so cheap, or vend them so well, as they used to do; the price of slaves (and this is a circumstance by which those colonies are much affected) will be higher; and North-America, where their sugar, molasses, and spirits, used to find a great vent, is barred against them; all that part of these commodities therefore, which used to be sent to Louisiana, Canada, and its Islands, must be disposed of at some of their other markets; the necessary consequence of which will be that the prices of them must be lowered, and probably the sale of the Rum may hurt that of the French Brandies.

Here perhaps it will be said, that our neighbours, if they are forced to sell their sugar, &c. at lower rates than usual, will so much the more undersell us in the European markets; but it should be said rather that, being so much the more destitute of other markets,
they

they will be under the greater necessity of making the most of those they may have. And certainly it may be said that, the less they make of their commodities, the less their Colonies will thrive; so many the fewer will be the Planters, so much the more contracted the Plantations, and so much less valuable the returns they make to France; and, in consequence, so much less the service they will do it.

In the mean time, all that Navigation which was carried on between the French Islands and their Settlements in North-America, and which was one of the best branches of Navigation they had, is lost. "How so?" may some say; "Will not the want of this navigation and the markets in Canada be made up to them by the navigation from West Louisiana, and the markets there to be met with?" I answer no. This Province will never be able to equal the Provinces they have lost in either of these respects; and a great many years must pass, before it will be in either of these respects at all considerable.

Of the Indian Trade it can hardly ever have any share; for, First, The Indians have a much readier road by the Lakes to New-York, &c. than they can have to any Settlements on the Mississippi; and our territories lie between the Mississippi and very many of them.

Secondly, The Navigation from Europe to those Settlements of ours, by which the Indian Trade is served with the Commodities sent

to them from hence, is not half so long a Voyage as it is to New Orleans, and consequently we must be able to afford them our goods much cheaper than our neighbours will be able to afford theirs. And,

Thirdly, The Navigation, either to Europe, or the Sugar Islands, is both longer, and more hazardous, from West Louisiana, than it was from Canada, or Cape Breton; and in time of War their Ships will always be exposed to our cruizers either from Mobile, Pensacola, or Fort Augustine. These are disadvantages which will always keep the Colonies of West Louisiana down, and render it impossible for that Country to be ever very considerable in itself, or of any very great advantage to its sister Colonies of Martinico and Guadaloupe; these Colonies therefore can never again be so respectable as they were before this last War, nor can any thing but Faction and chagrined Ambition apprehend any dangerous accession of Power to France from them.

Should you now tell me, Reader, that I have made more words about this West Louisiana than it is worth, I must acknowledge it; and yet I am tempted to beg your patience, while I make another observation on this worthless subject. It is, that the French there now border on the Spaniards, and, of consequence, will soon be incroaching on them, and disputing about their boundaries; our good, *most christian* neighbours, we know, cannot forbear elbowing those who are next to them; and, as they are effectually stopped from mak-

ing

ing any incroachments on us, their humour must spread itself the other way, and, instead of frightening Heretics, intrude on Catholics. Hence we may after a while, spite of all *Compacts*, see them *quarrelling like brother and sister*.

It is melancholy to think that the circumstances of mankind, with regard to each other, should be such, that one man may take a reasonable pleasure in seeing another embarrassed and afflicted. Yet such is the situation into which the corruption of Human Nature has brought us. Since we know our neighbours would be glad to disturb our Peace, if they found it in their power to do so, it is warrantable for us to take a pleasure in thinking that they are likely to have this power withheld from them by the disturbance of their own.

But a great clamour is made about the Fishery which is allowed them, and the Power which that source of Navigation is to yield them. To which it is surely enough to answer, that we have seen what the Fishery could do for them, when, as I observed before, they were possessed of it in a much higher degree, and with very many more circumstances of advantage, than they have it now. With it then, and with all its advantages, they could never raise their Marine to a condition we had any reason to respect. Certainly then nothing but ignorance, or wilful perverseness, can pretend, that it, under the disadvantages with which it must labour

now, can ever raise them to a condition we ought to dread.

This observation will hold also, and lead us to a just conclusion, concerning every article of the French Trade, or Source of their Power ; or even concerning the whole Trade, and all the other advantages of France taken together, and considered in a collective view : viz. She is not, either in any particular sources of Power, or in a general collection of them all, better circumstanced than she was for many years before the late War, but, in many of them, has lost very great advantages, and is quite deprived of one of the most considerable among them. It is therefore highly absurd and unreasonable to suppose, that, in this maimed, mutilated state, she will be able to raise herself to a degree of power she could never attain to, when she had so many more and greater advantages. Despise we then the man who would disturb and terrify us by pretending that she will !

It will be perhaps worth our while to consider this part of our subject briefly in another light, and enquire what prospect our Ministers, when they made this Peace, had before them of the future circumstances of France ; for this prospect ought to have been seriously regarded by them. If they could see a probability of her being in an easy situation, and likely to recover her losses, they ought the more stiffly to deny her every point which might contribute any thing to such a recovery. If, on the contrary, it appeared
that

that France could not be long quiet after we should make Peace with her, but would soon be engaged in new Wars, which we might keep out of, it was their Duty to make an immediate Peace, that their Country might be the sooner relieved from the immense burthen of the War, without insisting on Points which, as our enemies would not be at leisure to make advantage of them, may well be accounted trifles.

Now it was easy to see that France would not long keep out of fresh squabbles on the Continent. The unnatural alliance betwixt her and the house of Austria was not likely to be brought to a final period without breeding ill blood between them. But, be that as it would, and supposing nothing should arise to occasion a contention between the French and any of their near neighbours, the King of Poland's Death, and the demand to elect a King of the Romans, were events which could not be far off, nor could they happen without engaging France in the disputes which they should occasion. France therefore, in a series of years to come, will not be so likely to recruit as to exhaust themselves; not so likely to give us any disturbance as to wish we would be quiet, and not think of disturbing them.

And why, now the Administration is shifted out of *German* into *English* hands, we may not hope to be quiet, whatever quarrels happen on the Continent, I do not know. What signifies it to us, who reigns in Courland, or even in Poland? What matters it to us, who

is made Bishop, King, or Emperor? We have seen and felt the vanity of favouring one House, or another; while we are true to ourselves, and mind our own interest more than other people, we shall be respected by Kings and Emperors, whoever he be who wears either of the titles; but, if we suffer ourselves to be duped into an unnecessary connection with either the one or the other, we shall be hated by those whom we oppose, and impoverished, not, perhaps, without being, at the same time, despised, by those we favour; we may also find it necessary, according to the custom of late Ministries, to undo to-day, at a great expence, what we did yesterday at a greater; in the mean time, we shall weaken ourselves, increasing our Debts and Taxes, and sacrificing our men, until we are unable to maintain our own quarrels, which either the common vicissitudes of the world, or our German connections, may run us into; and find ourselves reduced to a necessity of begging meanly, and perhaps *in vain*, protection of those Powers, whose greatness, or even *existence* *, is owing to what we have done for them; to those very efforts which have been the sole cause of our own *weakness*, as well as of their *power*.

* We are at every turn threatened by the tools of Faction, with the King of Prussia's resentment. I will not now ask what he has to resent, but I beg leave to ask whether the case supposed above will not be most flagrantly exemplified, if this Monarch should ever be guilty of such *ingratitude* to us, as to refuse any thing we can ever desire he would do to serve us?

This,

This, I say, might have been expected, had we continued under the management which has been so fond of making *conquests* in Germany. But we may now hope better things; may promise ourselves that our Peace shall not be disturbed for any quarrels but our own; and in consequence that we shall spend one age after another in security and repose, calmly looking on the storms which harass the rest of the World, and in condition of extending our compassion and benevolence to all who want relief, while all, as well they who do not want our help, as they who do, revere our Power, praise our Justice, and admire our Generosity; in such a situation hardly any State will wish to disturb us; certainly none will dare to provoke us.

Little reason then is there for supposing the Peace will be of short continuance. This objection is as ill grounded and insufficient as the rest; none of them prove any thing more, than that there are men who, to serve their own base selfish purposes, will traduce the best of Kings, and find fault with the best of Treaties.

Now, my Friends, if a good Peace is made for us, what are we concerned to enquire who made it? What are we either the better or worse for its being made by Mr. Pitt, Lord Bute, or any other person, Scot, or Englishman? Indeed, if a deserving servant of the Country has been hardly dealt with, it becomes us to stand up for him, to plead his cause, and exert our endeavours to procure him

him justice, and not suffer him to be defrauded of the honour and reward he has merited. But is this the case? Has Mr. Pitt been used hardly, or defrauded of any thing he has deserved?

I very freely acknowledge, that Mr. Pitt has deserved much of us: He conducted our affairs for some years with great ability, and under his management we prospered, and recovered ourselves, from a condition in which we were the object of universal contempt, to a state of dignity, which the whole world looks on with astonishment and admiration. This made me one of his greatest favourers; and I may justly, I believe, question whether any Englishman heard of his retiring from business, with more concern than I did.

But, if he would retire, who could hinder him? I thought indeed, from what was to be remembered, before he came into the administration, that the business of the Public could not be well carried on without him; and this I found was the opinion of many other men, as well as of myself. I wished therefore that he would again accept the Seals, and thought it impossible for a good Patriot, as I then accounted Mr. Pitt, to refuse them, if desired to take them by so good a Master in an honourable manner; but he has refused, though repeatedly, and in the most honourable manner, by this gracious Master desired and courted to take them. In defence of which refusal it it pleaded, that the Council rejected his advice.

I am

I am not disposed to condemn the advice given of attacking Spain in the Autumn of 1761. I believe the Rupture then would have been justifiable; but the forbearance and moderation, which his Majesty thought proper to shew, is more for the Nation's honour, and probably, as it hath pleased God to bless us with the success we have since had, not less for its interest. But let the measures, which Mr. Pitt then advised, be supposed as expedient and necessary, as he could think them; and that a refusal to comply with them shewed as great a wrongheadedness in the parties who were guilty of the refusal, as he would wish to charge them with;—this, surely, was not a reason why he should leave the Council. The less likelihood there was of their judging right, the more need was there of his continuing with them, and assisting them with his advice, whenever they would take it; and consequently the greater was his obligation, in point of duty to his Country, to do so. Difficulties might have arisen, in which they would have been glad to have committed their Country wholly to his management; and, if such difficulties had arisen, and the public weal had miscarried for want of him, I know not how he could have been held excusable in the sight either of God or Man.

Our Country is our Parent, intitled at all times to the best services of her children: and those have in all ages and countries been reckoned very unworthy men, who have re-
fused

fused to serve this Parent, when occasion has required it, with the sacrifice of their most favourite inclinations, their dearest interests, and even of their lives. What would our Right Honourable Patriot say to a Son, who should see a Mother in distress, which he supposed no-body but himself could help her out of, and yet refuse her his assistance, because some of her other Children differed with him in opinion concerning the manner of delivering her? Suppose we too, that he should see this Mother stretching out her hands to her discontented Son, and begging he would not forsake her, — can we think his anger would not rise against the unnatural Child, who should leave his Parent in such a state, even though he should urge in his defence, that she would not chide the rest of her Children from her, and trust to *him only*?

However, thanks be to God, no insurmountable difficulties have arisen: we went through the War, without Mr. Pitt's help, as gloriously as could be wished, and, as I think, I have shewn, have concluded it by a glorious Peace.

I have told the Reader, that I was once one of Mr. Pitt's greatest admirers; but, on reading what I have said of this Gentleman in some of these last lines, and perhaps in some other parts of my Address, I am sensible he will see that the Right Honourable Patriot does not now stand so fair in my opinion, and may, perhaps, expect an account, why I have so much changed my sentiments of him. He may
therefore,

therefore, if he pleases, know, that my regard for Mr. Pitt was much lessened by the parade of his procession to the Lord Mayor's dinner in 1761; it has been rendered still weaker, from time to time, by the repeated denials he has given to the gracious and honourable invitations made him to enter again into the Ministry; it has been suggested too, that he has patronized and encouraged the wicked wretches, who have endeavoured to render his Majesty's Government, since he left the Administration, suspected and odious to the People. If he has been guilty of this, if he has said himself, or employed any one else to say, what has a *tendency to disturb* men's minds, and make them think they are not well governed, he has highly failed, in point of Duty, Justice, and Gratitude.

It is said also of him, that, on the day when the Houses of Parliament were to pass their judgment on the Preliminaries, he left his house for that of the Parliament "wrapped up to the ears in flannel," and "in such a condition as should in all reason have prevailed on him to keep his bed." And it is said also, "that he appeared to support himself, while speaking in the House, with great pain and difficulty." Now to come abroad in these circumstances of pain and danger strongly speaks an errand of the last importance; and, no doubt, every one who should see him in this condition, or hear of it, would conclude, that nothing less than the Public Liberty and Safety depended on what he had to say, at that time. For, if what he had to offer might have been
said

said at any other time, as well as on that day, it was ridiculous and foolish in him to venture abroad in those circumstances; abroad, however, he ventured, and spoke, it seems, for three hours: Another circumstance this, which can be excused, only on the supposition that the welfare of the Nation depended on his making so long a speech.

And, after all, what was it that he said? Why, if we may believe the account given us at that time,

First, That some articles of the Preliminaries were very well.

Secondly, That some other articles were not so well, as he wished them to be; but on this point, I have been told, he was far from being so explicit, as he can be, when he pleases.

Thirdly, That this Country can never thrive, if the Government of it be not administered on Revolution principles.

Now which of these three particulars were so necessary to be told the House that day, as to justify the Right Honourable Gentleman's risking his valuable life? Let his partizans tell us.

I beg leave to observe, with regard to the second of them, that his words, in the famous letter of June 2 to Mr. Allen, seem to imply, that he was *explicit*, as to those he found fault with. "The Epithet, says he, of *ade-*
 " *quate*, given to the Peace, contains a de-
 " scription of the conditions of it so repugnant
 " to my unalterable opinion concerning many
 " of

“ of them, and fully declared by me in Parliament.”— If by this he means, that he *fully* declared his opinion the day when the Preliminaries were considered in the House, and he was wrapped up in his flannels, some Members, who wished very well to him, and heard him, gave a very *inadequate description of the conditions* of that part of his speech.

I also beg leave to ask, with regard to the third particular, what there was in it which *might* not have been deferred until another opportunity? Nay, which *ought* not to have been deferred until some day, when the attention of the House was not engaged on a subject of so great importance, which had no more connection with the Revolution than with the Conquest?

I readily subscribe to the doctrine, that this Country can never prosper under a Government that is not administered on Revolution principles; but it grieves me to hear Revolution principles talked of in such a manner, and at such a time, as may lead unwary men to think there is danger that his present Majesty will attempt to govern on other principles; for, surely, if ever any Prince gave his subjects reason to believe their *Liberties* were as *dear* to him as his *Prerogative* *, our gracious Sovereign has done so. It would be impertinent to set about giving a formal proof of so evident a point; yet I cannot help mentioning his Speech to the Parliament about the

* See the King's Speech to the Parliament, November 18, 1760.

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Commissions to be granted to the Judges; and, as the Reader may not have it by him, I shall here transcribe it.

My Lords and Gentlemen

UPON granting new Commissions to the Judges, the present State of their Offices fell naturally under Consideration.

In Consequence of the Act passed in the Reign of My late Glorious Predecessor King *William* the Third, for settling the Succession to the Crown in My Family, their Commissions have been made during their good Behaviour: But, notwithstanding that wise Provision, their Offices have determined upon the Demise of the Crown, or at the Expiration of Six Months afterwards, in every Instance of that Nature which has happened.

I look upon the Independency and Uprightness of the Judges of the Land as essential to the impartial Administration of Justice; as one of the best Securities to the Rights and Liberties of My loving Subjects; and as most conducive to the Honour of the Crown: And I come now to recommend this interesting Object to the Consideration of Parliament, in order that such farther Provision may be made for securing the Judges in the Enjoyment of their Offices, during their good Behaviour, notwithstanding any such Demise, as shall be most expedient.

Gentlemen

Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

I must desire of you, in particular, that I may be enabled to grant and establish upon the Judges such Salaries, as I shall think proper ; so as to be absolutely secured to them during the Continuance of their Commissions.

This Speech was made in the first Session of his Parliament, within five months of his accession to the Throne ; and a branch of the Royal Prerogative given up, for strengthening the Subjects Liberty, unasked and unthought of by the Subjects themselves. Nor has his Majesty's subsequent conduct been in any respect disagreeable to this. And shall Revolution principles be talked of, in *this* King's reign, in such a manner as to insinuate they are in any likelihood of being disregarded ? Shall we be alarmed with outcries that our Liberty is in danger from such a Monarch ?

What can the man propose who is guilty of such attempts ? That he would disturb men's minds, and raise **Mobs** in opposition to the King, **is certain**. That he may in consequence overturn the Constitution of his Country, and involve her for a series of many years in bloody contentions, is not unlikely. And for what ? To take the reins of Government out of the hands of a lawful acknowledged King, who has shewn himself thoroughly

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disposed

disposed to promote the Country's welfare, and shift them into the hands of—we know not whom. It is probable the Right Honourable Gentlemen may think himself

“ a man

“ Fit to disturb the peace of all the world,

“ And rule it, when it is wildest.—

OTWAY'S *Ven. preserved*, Act 2d.

But it is possible he may in the event be shoved from his station by some of those whom he now despises, and employs only as tools, which are to be thrown aside, when the job is done. Where will his triumph then be, when, for the guilt of having destroyed his Country and most ungratefully abused his Sovereign, he finds himself rewarded only with neglect and insignificance? What will be his thoughts, when he compares the low and abject condition, in which he will then pine away his days, with the honourable station he might have enjoyed and served his Country in, under the best of Masters? A Master whom *Gratitude* should have endeared to him, if *Duty* could not?

But why do I talk of *Gratitude*? A Man who could support the dictates of ambition and pride against the gracious condescensions made to soften and win him to his duty the other day,—* who could hear such a Master as he has served so pathetically and so royally ex-

* See the Conference above, p. 32.

refs every sentiment which could do honour to his feelings as a Man, or as a King,—and yet refuse to concur with such a Master in the glorious work of making his Country happy,—must be looked upon as lost to every honourable sentiment. Gratitude and Duty must be empty unmeaning sounds with him : and, however he may abound in the great qualities of the Head, he must be grossly deficient in every valuable quality of the Heart. His great abilities therefore only render him more dreadful. Every thing is to be feared from one who has such Abilities without a proportionable Virtue to direct the exertion of them.

Let me not be thought to censure him so severely without reason. When he first came into employment, he was the most disinterested Statesman in the world. “ Nothing was
“ aimed at by him but to serve his Country.
“ The profits of it were a matter of in-
“ difference to him. The power of creating
“ dependants by disposing of Honours and
“ Offices he would leave to other people.” His friends were all told “ they had nothing
“ to expect from him.” If there was *one* who would not be so satisfied, who was resolute in insisting that he would reap some immediate fruits, of his connections with the great man, and would therefore put every thing into confusion, if he had not his demands, *the rest* were forced to be contented with

the bare honour of cooperating with the Right Honourable Gentleman.

For such a conduct we thanked and honoured him. But, it seems, we were not to expect he should always persist in such a disinterested conduct. He intended the time should come, when he would rule the roast as much, indeed, more than any one had done. When he would have all the world dependent on him, and be implicitly directed by his opinion. When every one should be stigmatized, who would presume to think for himself; and every one be excluded from office or honour, who would not crouch to him for them.

That these were his intentions the event has shewn. He has forfeited all just pretensions to be regarded as a disinterested servant of his Country by deserting her at the very time when she seemed to stand (and it is pretty clear that he then thought she did indeed stand) in most need of his assistance. And he has now professedly avowed that he will serve her no more, unless he is made the great and absolute *disposer of all things* just described. The King himself, he insists, shall have no Will of his own, nor any servant, but such as he pleases to appoint him.

Now is it possible that a man, capable of making such demands in the year 1763, could in the year 1761 serve his Country with a real unaffected disinterestedness? This would be a stranger *Revolution of Principles* than the Gentleman, practised as he has been in *Revolutions,*

lutions, can be justly suspected of. The conclusion then which must be drawn from his behaviour in September 1761, and since, is, that the appearance of disinterestedness, which he wore before that time, was no other than a hypocritical mask worn to cover the ambition and pride with which his heart was bloated, and which have now broke out with the more violence for having been so long suppressed. But is such a one to be thought worthy of superseding our gracious Sovereign? Shall the Popularity, which was given him at first, merely from the opinion we had of his being disinterested, be continued to him after he has betrayed such an insatiable Ambition? I hope not: since he has so ungratefully abandoned his Country, his Country, I hope, will abandon him to the obscurity, which he himself, if ever he returns to a just sense of his duty, will wish for to hide his head and his shame: we shall be able to do well enough without him; nothing is wanting to our being completely happy, but Unanimity and Loyalty to the best of Sovereigns.

I shall be here asked perhaps, whom I can charge with Disloyalty? Nor shall I hesitate to answer, every one who makes complaints to the People, with an intention to persuade them, that the affairs of the Commonwealth are managed wrong, and thereby incline us to oppose and distress his Majesty's Government.

Here too I expect to be told, that they do not find fault with his Majesty's Government,

but with the administration of his favourites : but do they not know, and, if it was their own case, would they not insist, that whatever is done by a King's Ministers, is done by his Majesty himself, except he be a Child, or an Idiot, or a Prisoner, with his hands so manacled as that he cannot have the use of them, any farther than his Masters will permit? That our present King is not a Child, or a Fool, I may presume will be granted me : but is he not a Prisoner? As much under management, and obliged to do and say what he is directed to speak and do, as if he was a Child? To this question I may answer *no*, while another may say it is so. And, as neither of us can have an opportunity of gaining satisfaction by personal observation, the dispute may be continued without end, if we will adhere to the sentiments, which prejudiced or interested people will endeavour to impress us with. What should we do then? I think we may satisfy ourselves extremely well, only by considering the affair in another light; for, if we are well governed, what does it signify to us, whether the wise measures of Government, which we have so much reason to be thankful for, are the result of his Majesty's determination by himself alone, or of advice given him by one or more counsellors? In this circumstance, our reasoning should run, — either the King approves these measures, and acquiesces in them, because he thinks them right, or he thinks other measures would be

be better, and submits to these only, because he is obliged to do so, his own inclination being overruled by the power of those who are about him: if the measures are the result of his own wisdom, every thing is as it should be; nor are things otherwise than they should be, if he is led to do what is done by the advice of any whom he pleases to consult. On either of these suppositions, it is an extravagant ridiculous impertinence for any subject to interfere, and tell his Majesty, "I do not like the advisers You now make use of, and therefore I expect You shall change them for myself, or such others as I have to recommend."

I will not now dispute, whether an English subject has not a RIGHT to do this; let it be supposed he has; would a wise man expose himself by playing the fool to the disgrace and hurt of his Family, because he has a *right* to do so?

My Friends, the people, whose particular interests may be served by talking in this way, have their reasons for it: but what reason have we to join with them in their attempts to disturb and distress a Government, under which we are, or at least may be, if we please, easy and happy? As things are now, we are, or may be, very well: but if we will play the Doctor with our Body Politic, we may throw it into convulsions, and entirely ruin its present healthful Constitution.

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But we shall be told perhaps (for nothing is so absurd, but we may expect to be told it, nothing is more absurd, than what we have been told upon this subject) that we are not in either of the situations I have supposed. That the King resolves neither from himself, nor from a willing compliance with the advice given him, but from a blind implicit obedience to a Direction, which he is habituated to follow, and from which he cannot free himself.

Let this then be supposed to be the case : what would it be right for us to do ? To take his Majesty out of the hands in which he is at present, and put him into other hands ? What good end could be served by doing so ? If the new people who are to be placed about him should proceed in the same measures, it must be expected, that he would be as uneasy then as he is now ; which would not at all mend the matter, with regard to him ; and, if they changed the measures, I am afraid it would be worse for the Public ; this case then can be no motive for our wishing to see a change in the Ministry.

But nothing can be more absurd, than the supposition of his Majesty's being overruled in such a manner ; for it is acknowledged he is not an idiot ; and yet no one, but a most egregious idiot, would continue two days together in such a situation ; for he must see the Right Honourable Patriot and his Pospolite ready to take him under their protection ;
and

and would, no doubt, break away to them, if he had the least thought that he could have a better freedom among them, than he has in his present situation. Such a kind of talk, therefore, only proves, that the people, who presume to entertain us with it, expect to find *idiot* readers, either incapable, or indisposed to see or think any thing, but what they are pleased to tell us.

But let us resolve to judge for ourselves, and resent with a proper indignation the insolent Presumption of the men, whoever they are, who shall attempt to hoodwink us, and lead us into disobedience to God, ingratitude to the King, and, in consequence, destruction to ourselves.

Let us be true to ourselves, and pursue our own interest: if we can distress the Government, we may procure places for those who clamour, because they have not them: but, if we can enjoy the liberty, plenty, and peace, his Majesty wishes to establish among us, we shall ensure happiness to ourselves and our posterity.

Let us for a moment suppose that we join the cry, and hunt down the present Ministry, and fix those who envy them in their Places; —What shall we gain by it? The most that they can do for us is to maintain the liberty, peace, and prosperity of the Country. But we are in possession of these already; or at least might be so, if the Clamourers would
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let us alone to enjoy the Peace the King has so graciously given us.

But it is possible, that, though we many of us join the cry, we may not succeed in hunting down the prey: it may please God, in reward of his Majesty's Humanity and Piety, to defeat the strongest efforts of our combination to distress him. And, should God be pleased to do so, we should not only suffer the mortification of a disappointment, but must in the mean time suffer the mischiefs which a struggle in the State always brings with it; to recount these mischiefs would be to enumerate all the evils which a quiet orderly Commonwealthsman and a good neighbour would wish to be preserved from: a great growth of idleness and impudence, unreasonable jealousies and unkind animosities between one neighbour and another, with a great and ruinous dissipation of Gentlemen's private fortunes, are the never-failing consequences of Political Struggles; nor are these always the worst consequences. *Mobs* are encouraged; *mobs* the most furious, the most unruly, and the most mischievous of all wild beasts; the most violent enemy to order, reason, and justice, that we have to be afraid of.

In the mean while, the administration of Government must be carried on at an expence much greater than would otherwise be necessary, though they who administer it find it absolutely impossible for them to serve the Country's interests in many respects, in which
they

they would have effectually served them, if the Opposition did not prevent them. Experience has shewn, that Oppositions will calumniate, and traverse the most salutary measures of the Administration they dislike: and many are the good Laws we have lost the benefit of, because a Party, opposite to that which proposed them, had address and influence enough to cajole the People into a disapprobation of them.

I need not now expose the wickedness of such a behaviour: you Gentlemen, to whom I write are sufficiently sensible of it; and the wretches who can be guilty of it are dead to every consideration, but that of the vilest self-interest.

But may we not be in such circumstances as render an opposition to the measures of the Government not only allowable, but even necessary? No doubt but we may, and our own History will furnish us with abundant proof of it, and of the good effects such an opposition has produced: one instance, as being that which we have most reason to remember with pleasure, I beg leave to mention, viz. the Revolution. We owe every thing that is dear and valuable to the opposition which produced that happy event; but is the Nation now in circumstances at all similar to those into which the arbitrary measures of King James II. had brought it? Are our Liberty and our Properties now in any danger from the incroachments of the Prerogative?

rogative? If they are not, (and no one will think they are, who has with any attention observed the temper and principles of Government hitherto discoverable in his Majesty's conduct) why are Revolution Principles bel-
lowed out to us, in every speech, and every incendiary Pamphlet, as if the Kingdom's Liberty was at the last gasp? Why indeed, but in hopes of alarming our apprehensions, and engaging us in our fright to demolish our best friends, that their rivals may step into their Places? And, when they are seated in them, what have we to expect from them? Alas! if they do but as well as those who are in already have done, we shall have reason to be thankful: but we have reason to fear they will not do as well; the man who raises himself to power by ingratitude and calumny is not very likely to exercise it with justice and integrity.

But what makes the Administration of these forward Patriots the more to be suspected is, that it is professedly one part of their scheme to *guide* the King, i. e. controul him; his Virtues, then, his Humanity, his Piety, his Zeal for the subject's Liberty are to be all lost to us; the kindest things which he can propose to do for us must all be quashed, if they do not suit the good-will and pleasure of his Lords and Governors. The word *guide* has been partly apologized for, and partly justified; a milder interpretation than it will fairly bear has been given to it, to soften the harshness
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of its proper meaning; but still the notion of *managing* has been retained, and the propriety of it insisted on; nor has the Right Honourable Gentleman ever, as I have heard, disclaimed it so far as to acknowledge the expression to be an improper one, or to profess himself ready to serve the King, without being allowed to *guide* him.

It is plain from the other day's conference which has been already quoted, that he is resolved to controul his Majesty in the strictest and harshest sense. And indeed the occasion on which the word in question was used sufficiently shews, that by it was meant *Controulment* in its highest and most odious degree; i. e. that his advice should always be implicitly followed, even though the King and all the Council but himself thought other measures more expedient. So that we are to have in him a Grand Vizier more absolute than he who rules in Turkey; for the Turk is subject to the controul of the Monarch; but the Englishman will govern the King as absolutely as the Mussulman governs the People.

It may be unnecessary to expose this Gentleman's arrogant and arbitrary disposition any further; yet it cannot be improper, now we are on this subject, to take some notice of the cavalier treatment the Corporation of Bath has received from him. It seems they had the misfortune to think a little differently from his infallible Dictatorship, and dared to avow
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their opinion; and until this time we had always been told by the Dictator and his Corps, that Englishmen had a right to do so; nay we have been told, we are now every day told *, that it is the duty of our Parliament-men to be *guided* in their own opinion and conduct by the sentiments of their Constituents. Where then was the impropriety of this Corporation's having a judgment of its own? They did not pretend to direct their great man; they only presumed to think for themselves, and yet have offended too heinously to receive a pardon. The inexorable Gentleman will not again do them the honour of representing them. Poor Bath!

It has always been held, that "what is sawce for a *Goose* is sawce for a *Gander*." But forsooth the *vir gregis*, the *Gander* of our times, will not allow it; it is for common souls only to regard the sentiments of their Constituents; he is a Being of a superior kind, uncontrollable and infallible: and the daring to think differently from him is a Heresy to be punished with the severest of Excommunications.

In one respect however methinks the Gentleman stops short of doing what after such a blustering may have been expected from him. He should not only tell them he will *no more* represent them, but shew them he will *no longer* represent them. I have such an opi-

* See Instructions from the Cyder Counties and Boroughs to their Representatives, and the Answers to those Instructions — in every Week's News-papers.

nion of the King's goodness as to believe his Majesty, notwithstanding the Patriot's undutiful behaviour, may be prevailed on to bestow some *place* on him, which, without laying him under any obligation to desert his Party, will vacate his present seat in Parliament, and free him from the shame of thinking *he sits there as the Representative of a Body of men, who have presumed to "give the epithet of adequate to the Peace."*

When I began to write to you, Gentlemen, I did not intend being so prolix in my address. But my zeal for my Country's welfare, and consequently my wishes to prevent (if I may be so happy as to be in any degree an instrument of preventing!) your taking steps, which it will not be in your power to recall, when You perceive they are wrong ones, make me press the point so far.

But I hope it will please the good Providence of God to prevent our taking wrong steps in a case of this importance. I hope he has not given us such a King, merely to shew how unworthy we are of him: but that he will strengthen him in such a manner as will render him as able as he appears to be willing to make us happy.

But, O gracious Sovereign, how can we hope that such a perpetual contradiction of unworthy men against thee will not at length prevail to weary thee, and lead thee to resolve that thou wilt no longer strive with such an ungrateful People, but punish us, as we deserve,

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deserve, by giving us up to be the victims of our own folly, and leaving us to the management we call for: — to the management of men who delight in War? Who would sacrifice the lives of their fellow-subjects without compunction, and load them with Debts and Taxes, beyond the power of patience or industry to support; who professedly aim to divide us into Parties, and revive those distinctions, under which we have so long harassed each other, and frightened Peace, Concord, and Prosperity from among us.

Shouldst thou resolve to give us up to these men, thou mayest perhaps consult thy present ease. They would probably gratify thee in every inclination thou hast, except that which disposes thee to be the common Father of thy People. But couldst thou thus enjoy thyself? Couldst thou bear to see thy People excited to animosities against each other by jealousies artfully fomented between one Party and another, while all, except the few who have their ends to serve by them, lose by these confusions the tranquillity, comfort, and enjoyment of their lives, which it is the wish of thy soul to give them?

Heaven forbid that thou shouldst have the trial? But the trial, the irksome, teizing, mortifying trial thou must have, unless with a patience and perseverance equal, to the great occasion, thou dost persist in thy magnanimous resolution of bearing with our frowardness, and humouring our peevish folly, till thou
canst

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can't make us sensible how unreasonable it is, and convince us that thou art not only our Father, but our Friend ;—that our happiness is as dear to thee, as it is to ourselves ; and that thou can't judge better than we can what is our true interest, and what are the properest measures for promoting it.

Nor will it need, I trust, any long effort of this Magnanimity to remove our prejudices, and open both our eyes to see, and our hearts to acknowledge, thy goodness to us ; for we are a well-meaning honest People, apt indeed to be too hasty in forming judgments, and, being conscious that we mean well, and not suffering ourselves to consider that the best intention cannot carry us right, if we follow a *Guide* which leads us wrong, we are apt also be too violent in adhering to opinions which perhaps without either reason or thought we have entertained. But this violence at length wears away, reason resumes her proper authority over us, and we with shame and confusion of face acknowledge we have been imposed on, and detest the Impostors which misled us. And I hope the time of our doing this, with regard to thee, is not far distant.

For though the men who raised the Cry have found means to keep it up within thy hearing, where all their art and power is exerted for this purpose ; in many parts of the Country we begin to think, and consequently to perceive our error, Nor shall the utmost artifice of thy ungrateful enemies prevail much longer to support their Faction against thee.

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thee. The dutious affection of thy Subjects to thee shall, ere long, burn with the same zeal which inflamed it, at thy accession to the Throne. Thy Benevolence and Goodness shall not then be lost on an undeserving and ungrateful People. They shall be impressed on every heart, sparkle in every eye, and be sounded forth from every tongue. Public happiness shall display itself with a brighter lustre than it has ever yet shone with among the human race; and Liberty, dressed out by thee, shall be more admired and loved, and be worshipped with a devotion more agreeable to her nature, than as ever yet been paid her in any Country.

Thus shall thy People regard thee as their tutelary protecting Deity, while thy neighbours will love and honour thee. They will know thy Justice too well to dread thy Power, and will join in the wishes of thy own People, so far as to wish the Human Nature could be immortal in thee; as they will be sensible they can have nothing to fear from Britain, till a Successor, destitute of thy Virtues, shall be possessed of thy Power.

But why should it be thought that a Monarch, sprung from thee, should not possess thy Virtues? It is surely more reasonable to hope, that Heaven will hear the prayers of its servants, and continue thee among them in thy child and thy childrens children.


Then shall the Pens of the loyal British Subjects, who are now forced to engage themselves in the disagreeable altercations of Political

cal Debate, be employed in recording the blessings and glories of thy Reign. And it shall be remarked by them, that “ in the
“ middle of the 18th Century the magnanimity and charity of the British Isles recommended them to the Divine Favour in
“ such a manner, that the good Providence of God gave them George III. to rule
“ them. A Monarch in whom were united the heroic qualities of knowing how to
“ conduct a War, and loving the sweets of Peace. The latter however was predominant, and suffered him to exert the former,
“ only so far as was necessary to bring his enemies to reason, and oblige them to
“ make Peace with him upon such terms as were necessary to preserve and ensure the
“ tranquillity and prosperity of his subjects; which he so effectually did by the wise
“ provisions he made for these purposes in the articles of the Treaty concluded in
“ 1763, and his prudent administration of Government in his succeeding Reign, that
“ now for almost a Century his People have had either no disputes with their neighbours, or none that ripened to a War. In
“ the mean time Trade, the ingenious Arts, and every thing that can make a Kingdom
“ great and happy, have flourished and gained ground every day. The enormous Debt
“ which the Nation groaned under at the conclusion of the War, and the heavy
“ Taxes we then paid, have gradually diminished to what they are at present, when the

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“ Taxes we pay seem to be such only as were
“ laid on rather to restrain Vice or Folly,
“ than to raise Money. Such is our present
“ Prosperity and Glory! May God continue
“ it, and keep our hearts always thankful to
“ Himself, and loyal to the King!

November 14, 1763.



P O S T.

P O S T S C R I P T.

THE Countryman desires the Reader may be acquainted that, when he sent up his papers to the press, he little doubted but they would be ready to be published by the end of the last month. A circumstance he thinks it necessary to mention to account to his Readers for some particulars which, by the time the pamphlet gets into their hands, may be so far out of date, as to be matter of wonder to them why they are (as things may then stand) troubled with them.

Their wonder however will be lessened, when they are informed, that I am so far from the town, as not to have an opportunity of knowing in time either how the work goes on at the press, or how the face of affairs changes in the political world; his candour will therefore, I trust, make the allowances necessary on these accounts.

I hope he will not think that the whole ought to have been suppressed, if one or two of the particular articles spoken of should happen to be out of date; for the chief thing aimed at in it, viz. to shew mistaken men their error with relation to the Peace, and to awaken them to a consideration of the mischiefs we are running into by our encouraging ambitious men in their opposition to the Government, seems more necessary than ever, the audacious insolence of the Mob and the outrages offered to the King being carried to such a height, if the Papers say true, as we Countrymen can hardly believe possible to be at-

P O S T S C R I P T.

tempted by the people, or suffered by the Magistrates.

“ London, November 5. This day a certain great Personage was placed in effigy
“ on a white horse, dressed in a plaid suit,
“ with a thistle and crown, and carried in
“ procession through Whitechapel, after
“ which he was hanged up on a gibbet and
“ then burnt to ashes.”

Where was at this time Loyalty, Duty, or Decency ; or where was Magistracy ? Do not we know that the populace, when suffered to indulge themselves in licentiousness (liberty, if they will have it so) of this kind, are capable of any mischief ? Are their movements to be governed by the rules of order and discipline ?

Is not every one, who hath any thing to lose ;—who hath a house to be set on fire, a shop or barns to be rifled, a wife or daughters to be dishonoured, or fields, woods, and parks to be abused ;—is not every such a one concerned to use his endeavours to quell such proceedings ? It may now be the weavers, or taylors, whose grievances are to be redressed. To-morrow the inclosures will be complained of, and stoups, rails, and hedges must be demolished. And the next day, perhaps, nothing will satisfy them, but a community of goods and chattels, and an equal partition of the land.

These evils, my Countrymen, may be much easier prevented than cured. But they can be prevented only by every honest man's steadily using his utmost efforts to quash and
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discourage all mobbish, riotous proceedings, whatever cause may be pretended for them.

It is seldom that the people, who set them on foot, assign the true reason of their doing so. They may, therefore, be leading us not only to blaspheme God and the King, but to forge fetters for ourselves, while they pretend only to be zealous for our liberty. But, admitting that this is not the case, and that they indeed intend nothing but the Country's good, it can never be certain, that a Mob, which finds itself master, will stop where it should do, and not exceed the bounds assigned them. Admitting yet farther, that in one or more instances even this is done, and the mob acts the real Patriot; yet these are precedents, which, by encouraging and promoting this sort of Tumults, may, on some future occasion, overturn the Constitution, and do ten times as much mischief as ever it had done good.

In every view, therefore, even on the most favourable suppositions which can be made for them, it is every man's interest, as well as duty, to discourage them.

F I N I S.

The Countryman begs his Readers will be so good as to excuse slighter errors of the press, and correct the following, which he has observed in the sheets which have been sent him.

Page 9, line 19, read *grinds*.

— 26, — 27, — is it.

— 31, — 13, — Now 319.

— ib. — 21, — go on to do justice to the
humility.

— ib. — 26, dele *the* before *other Scriptures*.

— 32, line 17, for as read us.

